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A PASSIVE COLLABORATION: 
BUREAUCRACY, LEGALITY, AND THE 
JEWS OF BRUSSELS, 1940–1944 
David Fraser∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
eading historian Jean-Philippe Schreiber argues that 
there are still remarkable lacunae in the history of the 
Holocaust in Belgium.  He writes that “[o]ne of the issues still to 
be thoroughly investigated for Belgium is the relations between 
Jews and non-Jews under the Occupation.”1  The role played by 
local Belgian administrations and elected officials in imple-
menting the initial German measures against the Jews of Bel-
gium is one area in which study has only just begun.2 
  
 ∗ Professor of Law and Social Theory, University of Nottingham School 
of Law.  Much of the research for this paper was undertaken while I was a 
Charles H. Revson Foundation Fellow at the Center for Advanced Holocaust 
Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM), Washington 
D.C.  My thanks to the Foundation and the Center, especially the Archives’ 
staff, without whose help and support this work would not have been com-
pleted.  The Arts and Humanities Research Board’s (AHRB) Research Award 
(APN 16324) supported other research.  I am also grateful to the AHRB for its 
long-term funding of my project on legality, resistance and collaboration in 
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Mayor of Brussels, kindly granted me access to the files from the Mayor’s 
Office for the years of German Occupation.  I would also like to acknowledge 
the staff of the Archives of the City of Brussels, who offered friendly advice 
and assistance in my preliminary explorations of their holdings.  An early 
version of this project was presented at the University of Warwick, Center for 
Social Theory.  For comments and suggestions at several stages in the produc-
tion of this article, my thanks to Daniel Bovy, Thierry Rozenblum, and Ber-
nard Suchecky. Responsibility for the content is, as always, entirely my own, 
and unless otherwise noted, all translations were done by me. 
 1. Jean-Philippe Schreiber, Belgium and the Jews Under Nazi Rule: Be-
yond the Myths, in NAZI EUROPE AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 469 (David Bankier 
& Israel Gutman eds., 2003).  See also Jean-Philippe Schreiber, La Belgique et 
les Juifs sous l’Occupation nazie: L’histoire au-delà des mythes, 4 LES CAHIERS 
DE LA MÉMOIRE CONTEMPORAINE 59 (2002). 
 2. See generally LIEVEN SAERENS, VREEMDELINGEN IN EEN WERELDSTAD: 
EEN GESCHIEDENIS VAN ANTWERPEN EN ZIJN JOODSE BEVOLKING (1880–1944) 
(2000) (describing the peculiar situation in Antwerp during this time period) 
(French-language translation forthcoming); Thierry Delplancq, Des paroles et 
 
L 
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For the most part, Belgian historiography has focused on the 
wartime period and the Occupation generally, rather than on 
the specificities of anti-Jewish persecution.  In most accounts, 
the question of Belgian participation in Nazi atrocities is sub-
sumed under the broader rubric of collaboration and resistance.3  
In this article, I want to elucidate one of the most vexing and 
fascinating, yet under-studied, areas of Belgian Holocaust his-
tory: the role played by the Belgian state and its legal appara-
tus in the exclusion of the Jews of Belgium.  An assessment of 
the daily practices and discourses of administrators and elected 
officials in Brussels casts light on the clash between ideas of 
  
des actes: L’administration Bruxelloise et le Registre des Juifs, 1940–1941, 12 
CAHIERS D’HISTOIRE DU TEMPS PRESENT 141 (2003) (reporting the role of Belgian 
officials) [hereinafter Delplancq, Des paroles et des actes]; Thierry Delplancq, 
1940–1942, une cité occupée et ses juifs: Quelques aspects heuristiques, 3 
CAHIERS DE LA MÉMOIRE CONTEMPORAINE 125 (2001) (describing the role of 
Belgian officials) [hereinafter Delplancq, une cité occupée et ses juifs]; Thierry 
Rozenblum, Une cité si ardente: L’administration communale de liège et la 
persécution des Juifs, 1940–1942, 179 REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE LA SHOAH: LE 
MONDE JUIF 9 (2003) (in-depth, fascinating account of the fate of the Jews of 
Liège under the administration of Mayor Joseph Bologne).  See also Godelieve 
Denhaene, Les Juifs dans Certains Documents Communaux de Schaerbeek 
Pendant la Deuxième Guerre Mondiale, 1 CAHIERS DE LA MÉMOIRE 
CONTEMPORAINE 133 (1999).  Despite prolific scholarship in this area, Belgian 
historiography of the Holocaust continues to labor under many of the myths 
and lacunae identified by Schreiber, especially a reluctance to engage in 
thoughtful self-examination. 
 3. See, e.g., SYLVAIN BRACHFELD, ILS ONT SURVÉCU: LE SAUVETAGE DES JUIFS 
EN BELGIQUE OCCUPÉE (2001) (demonstrating that historical studies of the role 
of non-Jewish Belgians in the Holocaust focus primarily on rescue stories).  
Efforts at determining the Belgian role in the mechanisms of exclusion and 
death put in place by the German occupiers for the Final Solution in Belgium 
are only beginning.  In this area, and in all others relating to the Holocaust in 
Belgium, the most obvious point of reference is Maxime Steinberg’s monu-
mental and seminal history of the Shoah.  See generally MAXIME STEINBERG, 
LA PERSÉCUTION DES JUIFS EN BELGIQUE, 1940–1945 (2004) [hereinafter 
STEINBERG, LA PERSÉCUTION DES JUIFS]; MAXIME STEINBERG, L’ÉTOILE ET LE 
FUSIL: 1942 LES CENT JOURS DE LA DEPORTATION DES JUIFS DE BELGIQUE (1984) 
[hereinafter STEINBERG, 1942 LES CENT JOURS]; MAXIME STEINBERG, L’ÉTOILE 
ET LE FUSIL: LA QUESTION JUIVE, 1940–1942 (1983) [hereinafter STEINBERG, LA 
QUESTION JUIVE]; MAXIME STEINBERG, L’ÉTOILE ET LE FUSIL: LA TRAQUE DES 
JUIFS, 1942–1944 (1986) [hereinafter STEINBERG, LA TRAQUE DES JUIFS].  See 
also DAN MICHMAN, BELGIUM AND THE HOLOCAUST: JEWS BELGIANS GERMANS 
(1998); MAXIME STEINBERG, UN PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES JUIFS: BELGIQUE ENTRE 
FRANCE ET PAYS-BAS (1998) [hereinafter STEINBERG, UN PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES 
JUIFS]. 
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citizenship, “Belgianness,” Constitutional duty,4 and the bu-
reaucratic necessity of efficiently complying with German legal 
edicts.  This examination provides a more nuanced understand-
ing of Belgian historical reality, as well as a more insightful 
inspection of the institutional and political dynamics of modern 
governance, legality, and the Holocaust. 
For a variety of reasons the question of local participation in 
Jewish persecution in Belgium has been ignored or downplayed 
in collaboration debates.  It is morally and politically easier to 
blame the Germans and a few local fanatics for anti-Jewish acts 
than to engage in a careful and nuanced study of Belgian com-
plicity.  This complex psychosocial, historical, political, and, I 
argue below, legal matrix of “forgetting” in Belgium has led to 
the creation of a glorious tradition of resistance to the Occupier.  
I do not mean to suggest that resistance by Belgians was simply 
mythological.  There was resistance and there were resisters to 
the Holocaust, non-Jewish and Jewish alike, just as there was 
collaboration and there were collaborators.  Instead, I argue 
that the creation of a mythological legal structure of resistance 
to Nazi measures has obscured the mechanisms by which Bel-
gians did share responsibility for the exclusion, persecution, 
and killing of Jews in Belgium.  
The common Belgian resistance myth concludes that the oc-
cupying military forced local administrators to identify, regis-
ter, and exclude “Jewish”5 individuals and businesses, and that 
these administrators resisted through delay and obfuscation by 
  
 4. See CONSTITUTION BELGE arts. 6, 14–16 (1924) (Article 6 guaranteed 
equality, while Articles 14, 15, and 16 established religious freedom.).  
 5. “Jewish” is used here as it is in the foreign-born, anti-Belgian taxo-
nomical structure of Nazism.  Throughout this article, I use the English “He-
brew” as an imperfect rendering of the French Israélite.  In French, the differ-
ence between Israélites, who identify themselves as citizens of a national 
community who happen to practice a particular religion or share a specific 
heritage, and Juifs, who identify as a group in a religious or ethnic sense and 
are therefore not members of the national community, is clear.  This distinc-
tion played a significant semiotic and practical role in the Belgian Holocaust; 
the difference between Belgian and foreign-born Jews was exploited by all 
sides in the complex arrangements of the bureaucracy of destruction.  See 
generally David Fraser, The Fragility of Law: Anti-Jewish Decrees, Constitu-
tional Patriotism and Collaboration in Belgium 1940–1944, 14 LAW & 
CRITIQUE 253 (2003) [hereinafter Fraser, Fragility of Law] (exploring this 
distinction). 
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relying on constitutional guarantees of equality and freedom of 
religion.6  For example, the post-war Belgian War Crimes 
Commission, outlining the first set of anti-Jewish decrees is-
sued by the Germans,7 described the role played by municipal 
institutions in implementing anti-Jewish measures on Belgian 
soil as tactical obfuscation: “[A] number of municipal admini-
strations systematically sabotaged the creation of a Register of 
Jews, under the pretext of overwork, lack of material or man-
power.  On this point, it is useful to note that the majority of 
Jews invited to register themselves obeyed.  Forty-two thousand 
gave their names.”8 
Official governmental records, detailing the role played by lo-
cal officials in the administration of the preliminary phases of 
the Holocaust in Belgium, support this mythology.  The records 
seem to indicate that, first, the Germans imposed the anti-
Jewish measures on Belgian officials; second, Belgian officials 
responded to these directives with passive compliance, and oc-
casionally, active resistance.  The use of passive voice and non-
accusatory grammatical construction, such as reflexive verbs, in 
these records reinforces the first two pillars of the myth struc-
ture by insinuating that Belgium did not register Jews; instead, 
the Jews registered themselves.  According to the official legal 
texts (the historical memory of the Holocaust in Belgium), thou-
sands of Jews who had fled pogroms in Poland and Russia, or 
who had left Germany after Hitler’s rise to power, declared 
themselves.  This is the official story of the Holocaust in Bel-
  
 6. U.N. INFO. ORG., Persecution of the Jews, in CONDITIONS IN OCCUPIED 
TERRITORIES 1 (1943).  The Allied governments issued a report in 1943 prais-
ing the Belgian population for its lack of enthusiasm for, and resistance to, 
anti-Jewish measures imposed by the Germans.  Id. at 3–4.  The report notes: 
“[t]o the annoyance of the Nazis, these measures met with but little response 
from the Belgian population.”  Id. at 4.          
 7. These anti-Jewish decrees were called “Verordnung” in German.  I use 
the English terms “decrees” and “orders” instead of the German “Verordnung” 
or the French “Ordonnance.”  Both terms convey that administrative decisions 
made by the Occupying Power had legislative force and effect. 
 8. COMMISSION DES CRIMES DE GUERRE, LES CRIMES DE GUERRE, COMMIS 
SOUS L’OCCUPATION DE LA BELGIQUE, 1940–1945: LA PERSECUTION 
ANTISEMITIQUE EN BELGIQUE 19 (1947) (“Ainsi, nombre d’administrations 
communales sabotèrent systématiquement l’établissement du registre des 
Juifs, sous prétexte de surcharge de travail, du manque de matériel ou de 
main d’œuvre.  A cet égard, il est utile de noter que la plupart des Juifs invités 
à s’inscrire, s’exécutèrent.  Quarante-deux mille donnèrent leur nom.”).   
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gium as told by the Belgian War Crimes Commission and the 
prosecutors at Nuremberg.  This is the legal history of the Holo-
caust in Belgium.9   
It is this somewhat bizarre historical category, “passive col-
laboration,” which I argue characterizes the myths about local 
participation in the persecution of Jews.  And this passivity is a 
direct result of the interpretation of the limits of constitutional 
conduct by the highest legal authorities in the country.  While 
dominant myths support the story of resistance and reluctant 
compliance by Belgian officials in implementing anti-Jewish 
orders, the records used to support these myths can also be in-
terpreted another way.10  This article examines the ways in 
which these records support the theory that Belgian officials 
did, in fact, carry out the identification and registration of Jew-
ish individuals and businesses.  The records demonstrate, more-
over, that these Belgians were not proponents of the New 
Order;11 they were elected officials and civil servants who per-
ceived themselves as patriotic Belgians.  The question then, is 
how did loyal, patriotic Belgians, aware of the Belgian constitu-
tional guarantees of equality and religious freedom, participate 
in the economic and physical exclusion of those identified as 
Jews? 
Part of the answer lies in notions of citizenship and in the 
historical reality of the Belgian Jewish population in 1940.  At 
that time, most of the Jews in Belgium were not Belgian citi-
zens, but rather, immigrants from Eastern Europe, Poland, and 
Russia, and German refugees.12  Protests based on the funda-
  
 9. See Delplancq, une cité occupée et ses juifs, supra note 2, at 128. 
 10. Dan Michman, Problematic National Identity, Outsiders and Persecu-
tion: Impact of the Gentile Population’s Attitude in Belgium on the Fate of the 
Jews in 1940–1944, in NAZI EUROPE AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 455, 464 (David 
Bankier & Israel Gutman eds., 2003) (Michman notes that “the implementa-
tion of the anti-Jewish measures—both the legal and the economic—could be 
carried out (even if only partially) by the Belgian bureaucracy.”). 
 11. The term “New Order” came to stand for the Nazis’ political conquest of 
Europe.  See Joseph Goebbels, The Coming Europe, Address to Czechoslova-
kian Artists and Journalists (Sept. 11, 1940) (“Our well populated Reich and 
Italy will lead Europe.  That will happen.  There is no changing it.  For you, 
this means that you are part of a large Reich that will give a new order to 
Europe.”), available at http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb31.htm. 
 12. See Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 273–74.  The topic of po-
lice operations in Belgium during the pre-war era, particularly those involving 
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mental constitutional guarantees of equality and religious free-
dom did not occur, with one notable exception: opposition to the 
Yellow Star Order, which made mandatory the wearing of the 
Yellow Star by all Belgian Jews.13  This failure is attributable, 
at least in part, to the legal framework established by Belgian 
authorities, in particular, the Permanent Council of Legislation 
and the Secretaries-General.14  The Permanent Council was a 
body established by Royal Decree and exercised purely advisory 
jurisdiction.  Because it was made up of the highest ranking 
members of the judiciary and legal worlds, its real powers of 
  
aliens (police des étrangers), offers fertile ground for further historical re-
search.   
 13. See Rozenblum, supra note 2, at 31–32 (noting the protest by Mayor 
Bologne of Liège over the Yellow Star).  Other types of protests, relating spe-
cifically to the creation or operation of Jewish schools and the use of Belgian 
police in arresting Jews, also took place.  Id.  The Yellow Star order led to 
other isolated acts of refusal and resistance by officials in Occupied Europe.  
See, e.g., DAVID FRASER, THE JEWS OF THE CHANNEL ISLANDS AND THE RULE OF 
LAW 1940–1944: QUITE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH JUSTICE 119–
43 (2000) (depicting the story of the Bailiff and Attorney-General of Jersey).  
 14.  Vivian Grosswald Curran, The Legalization of Racism in a Constitu-
tional State: Democracy’s Suicide in Vichy France, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 8 
(1998) (national constitutions are not sterile texts, but documents that live in 
the hearts and minds of those who enforce them, those who apply them, and 
those who live under them).  Discussions focusing on the implementation of 
anti-Jewish laws, such as the viewpoint provided by Thierry Delplancq in his 
recent article, Des paroles et des actes, supra note 2, overemphasize the un-
constitutional nature of Brussels’ implementation of anti-Jewish laws and 
downplay the importance of the Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the 
Land and Customs of War on Land (Hague Convention).  See generally Hague 
Convention (II) with Respect to the Land and Customs of War on Land and its 
annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 
1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (entered into force Sept. 4, 1900).  Interpre-
tation of the Hague Convention provided the overriding legal norm from June 
1940 onward, governing relations between the Occupiers and the Secretaries-
General and providing a template for the Conseil de Législation’s interpreta-
tion of the Belgian Constitution.  Delplancq is no doubt correct that a com-
plete understanding of the attitude of Brussels’ administration would involve 
a multi-factorial analysis.  As a lawyer, however, I would insist that we never 
underestimate the legitimizing impact of a clearly established legal frame-
work for persecution.  See generally STEINBERG, UN PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES JUIFS, 
supra note 3; Pim Griffioen & Ron Zeller, La persécution des Juifs en Belgique 
et aux Pays-Bas pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale: Une analyse compara-
tive, 5 CAHIERS D’HISTOIRE DU TEMPS PRESENT 73 (1998); Wolfgang Seibel, The 
Strength of the Perpetrators—The Holocaust in Western Europe, 1940–1944, 
15 GOVERNANCE 211 (2002).   
File: Fraser MACRO 03.13.05.doc Created on: 3/14/2005 12:24 PM Last Printed: 3/14/2005 4:30 PM 
2005] A PASSIVE COLLABORATION 371 
persuasion and authority far exceeded its formal consultative 
jurisdiction.  The Secretaries-General were the senior, ranking 
civil servants in each government department, the equivalent of 
British Permanent Secretaries. 
The Belgian experience exemplifies the legitimizing functions 
law and legality can play by demonstrating how they permitted 
compliance with the German anti-Jewish measures.  Thierry 
Rozenblum, in his path-breaking work on the history of the 
Jews in the city of Liège during the Occupation, highlights the 
ways in which local officials complied with the anti-Jewish 
laws.15  At the same time, Rozenblum underscores the un-
doubted historical reality of Liège as a major center of the Bel-
gian resistance.16  Rozenblum begins his exhaustive study by 
asking: 
[W]hy did the administration and Mayor of Liège so scrupu-
lously execute the anti-Jewish decrees promulgated by the Oc-
cupier, without ever having denounced them as being clearly 
contrary to the Belgian Constitution, when at the same time 
they constantly invoked that very same Constitution to ob-
struct, sometimes successfully, any number of other measures 
commanded by the German authorities?17 
The failure of officials in Brussels, like their counterparts in 
Liège, to invoke the Belgian Constitution (Constitution) in de-
fense of compatriot Jews can be understood, albeit not exhaus-
tively, by carefully studying the legal background of the passive 
collaboration phenomenon.  The Constitution was, in large part 
  
 15. See generally Rozenblum, supra note 2 (describing treatment of Jews 
by local officials in Liège).   
 16. Id. (Local officials, including the Mayor, Joseph Bologne, did not hesi-
tate to obstruct German demands, either through outright refusal or by legal 
argument.  They invoked provisions of the Hague Convention in order to place 
legal and constitutional sticks in the wheels of German actions.  The one area 
in which they failed to act in such a way was in the implementation of anti-
Jewish laws.).   
 17. Id. at 10  
([P]ourquoi l’administration communale liégeoise et son bourgmestre 
ont-ils si scrupuleusement exécuté les ordonnances antijuives pro-
mulguées par l’occupant, sans jamais dénoncer leur caractère fonciè-
rement contraire à la Constitution belge, alors que dans le même 
temps ils ne cessaient d’invoquer cette même Constitution pour faire 
obstruction, parfois avec succès, à quantité de mesures ordonnées par 
les autorités allemandes?). 
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at least, rendered irrelevant to the implementation of anti-
Jewish measures in Belgium by the operation of Belgian law 
itself.  The Constitution was limited by a series of legally bind-
ing interpretations of its force and effect under German Occu-
pation, such that Belgium’s Jews became extra-legal subjects, 
ripe for administrative, but not aggressive, identification as un-
Belgian.  Thus, passive collaboration was lawful by the opera-
tion of the normative and legitimizing structures of the Belgian 
state and juridical apparatus under the Occupation.  
Research into municipal records made during the Occupation 
of Belgium is beset with practical problems, making any explo-
ration into the fundamental factual and ideological questions 
regarding the Holocaust all the more difficult.  Many archives 
are closed and require special permission for access; the “hun-
dred year rule” prevents scholars from identifying the subjects 
of many records from the Second World War; further, many files 
are incomplete or missing.18  Archival files from the Mayor’s Of-
fice (Cabinet de Bourgmestre), pertaining to the Occupation 
years, are incomplete.19  Indeed, the file concerning the Register 
of Jews bears the following note from the 1970’s: “The Register 
of Jews for Brussels has disappeared.”20 
  
 18. See Delplancq, une cité occupée et ses juifs, supra note 2, at 133–34. 
 19. See Inventaire No. 33, Cabinet du Bourgmestre, Archives de la Ville de 
Bruxelles [hereinafter AVB], at VIII (transcript on file with the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law).  Indeed, the Inventory summarizes the state of 
the holdings as follows:  
The part of the holdings relating to the war 1940–1945 is much less 
interesting.  The documents, especially the correspondence with the 
Occupying Power were found in a state of extreme disorder, which 
could only be remedied to a small degree.  Moreover, it appears that 
many of the files have been destroyed or removed. 
Id.  
(La partie du fonds relative à la guerre 1940–1945 offre beaucoup 
moins d’intérêt.  Les documents et surtout la correspondance avec 
l’autorité occupante ont été trouvés dans un désordre extrême, auquel 
il n’a été possible de remédier que dans une faible mesure.  Il semble 
d’ailleurs que beaucoup de dossiers aient été détruits ou emportés.). 
 20. Dossier relating to the Register of Jews (Dossier relative au registre des 
juifs), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 bis Guerre 40–45 Direction de 
l’Etat Civil (transcript on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law).  This does not mean there was no Register of Jews for Brussels.  In 
Liège, several versions of the Register were created and transferred to various 
authorities during and after the war.  See Rozenblum, supra note 2, at 20–29.  
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Many of the documents examined in this Article derive not 
from files and records held and maintained by the Mayor, but 
from copies maintained by Mr. Gries, the translator.  Gries 
translated into German not only communications between the 
Mayor and German authorities, but also communications be-
tween the Germans and other city officials.  Likewise, Gries 
translated those communications originating with the Occupi-
ers into French prior to their distribution to appropriate de-
partments or officials.21  Thus, many of the documents to which 
I refer here are carbon copies, not originals.22  
This article, then, is about bureaucratic action as embodied in 
the writings of the bureaucrats themselves, nothing more and 
nothing less.  There are, of course, counter-narratives, subtle-
ties of distinction and real stories behind the documents.  For 
example, it may well be that in Brussels, as in other parts of 
Belgium, local authorities aided Jews by supplying them with 
“real false papers,” such as official birth certificates, nationality 
papers with non-Jewish origins, or food ration coupons under 
false identities for those Jews in hiding.  These acts of resis-
tance and rescue, however, will appear nowhere in official writ-
ten communications between departments or with the German 
authorities.  
  
A copy of the Register of Jews for Brussels is available at the USHMM; the 
Centre d’Etudes Guerres et Sociétés (CEGES), RG. 65.003 P, Reel 431; and 
the Jewish Museum of Belgium (Musée Juif de Belgique) in Brussels.  I am 
grateful to Bernard Suchecky and Thierry Rozenblum for clarifying the his-
tory of the Register of Jews for me.  In the immediate post-war period, Mon-
sieur Warans of the Population Office of the City of Brussels provided a brief 
history of anti-Jewish measures and the City administration for the Office of 
the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages.  On Nov. 9, 1944, Warans noted 
that the Ministry of the Interior requested that the Register of Jews be 
handed over to them; this was done on Nov. 30, 1944.  Note sur les ordonnan-
ces concernant les Juifs, Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 bis (Dec. 9, 
1944) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  City officials 
maintained two copies of the Register, one of which they kept from public 
scrutiny and safeguarded in case of the loss of the other.  See Instruction con-
cernant le registre des juifs (Nov. 15, 1940), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, 
File 866 bis (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 21. Until the appointment of Mayor Coelst, almost all extant correspon-
dence involving the municipal administration and its officials was in French. 
 22. As a lawyer, this troubles me.  The files are, in fact, incomplete copies, 
so the analysis to which I subject the documents in this Article is inevitably 
incomplete.   
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Nonetheless, an analysis of these texts tells a story of Belgian 
acceptance, however reluctant, of the new subject, “the Jew,” 
and exemplifies the fundamental importance of a legal frame-
work for the operation of antisemitism.  The belief in the legal-
ity of passive collaboration allowed Belgian officials to adopt the 
“hermeneutic of acceptance.”23 
II. ESTABLISHING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ANTISEMITISM 
A brief examination of the constitutional basis and govern-
mental structure under which the City administration operated 
during the Nazi Occupation is helpful for understanding the 
bureaucratic and legal application of anti-Jewish laws in Brus-
sels.  Although local officials worked under arduous and some-
times dangerous wartime conditions, they were nevertheless 
operating within a functioning legal system; Belgian govern-
ment and law continued to function during the Occupation.24  
Indeed, the German Occupation of Belgium from 1940 to 1944 
was to a large extent both premised and dependent upon the 
continuation of Belgian governmental and legal structures. 
After the defeat of the Belgian armed forces in the Blitzkrieg 
of May 1940, the elected government of Prime Minister Hubert 
Pierlot fled first to France, and then to London, where Pierlot 
established a government-in-exile.  Despite certain difficult is-
sues of continuation and succession of state governments in in-
ternational law, the legitimate and internationally-recognized 
embodiment of the Belgian state was the Pierlot regime in Lon-
don.25  Unlike France, which continued to have a functioning 
state apparatus in Vichy, as well as a counter-claim to legiti-
  
 23. Richard Weisberg, Bondage, Freedom & the Constitution: The New 
Slavery Scholarship and its Impact on Law and Legal Historiography: Slavery 
and Legal Ethics: The Hermeneutic of Acceptance and the Discourse of the 
Grotesque, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875, 1875 (1996).  
 24. See Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 257 (noting that the Sec-
retaries-General chose the lesser of two evils, opting to remain in Belgium as 
the Belgian government; Belgian pre-war legislation allowed them to take 
executive measures in emergency situations). 
 25. See generally François de Kerchove d’Exaerde,  Quelques Questions en 
Droit International Public Relatives à la Présence et l’Activité du Gouverne-
ment Belge en Exil à Londres (Octobre 1940–Septembre 1944), 23 REVUE 
BELGE DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 93 (1990).   
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macy in the form of DeGaulle’s “Free French” in England,26 the 
Belgian government, in the political and constitutional sense, 
was the government-in-exile in London. 
At the same time, however, the Belgian King, the head of 
state, remained in Belgium and continued to play a governmen-
tal role during the Occupation.27  More importantly, the bulk of 
judicial and civil service structures remained on Belgian soil 
and had ongoing interaction with the occupiers.28  The Secretar-
ies-General, the highest-ranking public servants from every 
governmental department, stayed in Belgium and carried out 
the day-to-day practical and constitutional operation of the 
country.  As with King Leopold, the legitimate role and activi-
ties of the Secretaries-General during the Occupation remains 
controversial.29   
At the end of the period of the “phony war,”30 the Belgian Par-
liament passed the “Law Relating to the Delegation of Powers 
during Wartime” (Delegation Law).31  Article Five provided that: 
 
When, as a consequence of military operations, a judge or a 
 civil servant, or a body of judges or of civil servants … is un
 able to communicate with the appropriate superior authority, 
 or if this authority has ceased its functions, he possesses, in 
  
 26. See, e.g., MAURICE FLORY, LE STATUT INTERNATIONAL DES 
GOUVERNEMENTS REFUGIES ET LE CAS DE LA FRANCE LIBRE 1939–1945 (1952). 
 27. See generally JEAN STENGERS, LEOPOLD III ET LE GOUVERNEMENT: LES 
DEUX POLITIQUES BELGES DE 1940 (1980). 
 28. The prosecuting authorities at the Nuremberg Trials summarized the 
relationship and governance structure: “This regime of the Secretaries Gen-
eral pleased the Germans, who adopted it.”  THE TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL SITTING IN 
NUREMBERG, PART 6, FEB. 2–13, 1946 37 (1946) [hereinafter TRIAL OF GERMAN 
MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS] (taken from official transcript).   
 29. See Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 257. 
 30. See PAUL-HENRI SPAAK, THE CONTINUING BATTLE: MEMOIRS OF A 
EUROPEAN 1936–1966 21–32 (Henry Fox trans., 1971) (referring to the period 
of time when German attack seemed imminent, during which Belgium 
claimed neutrality). 
 31. Loi relative aux délégations de pouvoirs en temps de guerre, MONITEUR 
BELGE, May 11, 1940, at 2860 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law) (All Belgian laws are passed in both French and Flemish; the 
French version is published in the Moniteur Belge, the Flemish version in the 
Belgisch Staatsblad.  For the sake of brevity, I will limit myself to the French 
text and citation throughout this Article.). 
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 cases of emergency and within the limits of his professional 
 activity, all the powers of that authority.32 
Under the Delegation Law, the Secretaries-General subse-
quently found themselves with the de facto power to govern 
Belgium until the return of the Pierlot government.33  After the 
fall of Belgium and the installation of the German Military Ad-
ministration (GMA), however, the Secretaries-General were 
unsure of the extent of their authority.34  Like all Belgians, the 
Secretaries-General bitterly remembered the brutality of the 
German Occupation during the First World War, and were re-
luctant to repeat that experience.35  They wished, to the greatest 
extent possible, to maintain the continued functionality of Bel-
gian legal institutions and government.36  Since the Germans 
also wanted a fully functioning and efficient Belgian govern-
ment administration to which to delegate or, more accurately, 
upon whom to impose,37 the legal question of the nature and 
extent of the delegation envisaged under Article Five of the 
Delegation Law became one of central importance.  
The Secretaries-General sought a legal opinion from two lead-
ing jurists, Joseph Pholien and Paul Tschoffen, concerning the 
nature and extent of their powers under the Delegation Law;38 
Pholien’s and Tschoffen’s response was central to the subse-
quent history of the anti-Jewish measures.  The Secretaries-
General inquired whether they possessed legislative power un-
der the terms of the delegation contained in Article Five and, if 
  
 32. Id.  
(Lorsque par l’effet des opérations militaires, un magistrat ou un 
fonctionnaire, un corps de magistrats ou de fonctionnaires … est pri-
vé de toute communication avec l’autorité supérieure dont il dépend, 
ou si cette autorité a cessé ses fonctions, il exerce dans le cadre de son 
activité professionnelle et pour les cas d’urgence, toutes les attribu-
tions de cette autorité.).   
 33. Id.  
 34. See id.  
 35. Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 257. 
 36. See id.  
 37. See TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 28, at 37.   
 38. See Consultation Letter from Joseph Pholien and Paul Tschoffen to 
Secretaries-General (June 6, 1940), reproduced in PIERRE LECLERCQ, 
L’EQUIVOQUE D’UNE LOI 62, 62–64 (1946) [hereinafter Letter from Pholien & 
Tschoffen, June 6, 1940].   
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they did not possess such powers, whether the German Occupi-
ers could confer them.39 
The answer from Pholien and Tschoffen set out the juridical 
framework within which the Belgian government would operate 
for the next four years.  First, they clearly established that the 
delegation in question took place only within “the limits of [the] 
professional activities” of the Secretaries-General, and thus, the 
sole authority that could be delegated was ministerial, not legis-
lative.40  While the Secretaries-General could not legislate, they 
could release “ministerial decrees” (des arrêtés ministériels).41  
Second, Pholien and Tschoffen affirmed that under Article 43 of 
the Hague Convention, the occupying power was vested with 
legislative authority to maintain peace and order over the con-
quered territory, and that such power could not be delegated.42 
Based on this interpretation, the German Military Com-
mander and the Secretaries-General signed an agreement for-
malizing their joint understanding of the operative legal 
framework of the Occupation.43  In short, the Secretaries-
General had a theoretically limited, but realistically quite ex-
tensive, power to enact measures having legal force in Belgium.  
They could not, however, be granted more extensive authority 
by the Germans, who retained legislative jurisdiction to enact 
  
 39. See id.  See generally Francis Delpérée, Joseph Pholien, juriste.  Trois 
consultations et les Mémoires: Le pouvoir exécutif en temps de guerre, in 
JOSEPH PHOLIEN: UN HOMME D’ÉTAT POUR UNE BELGIQUE EN CRISES 113 (Fran-
çoise Carton de Tournai & Gustaaf Janssens eds., 2003) (hagiography of Pho-
lien).   
 40. See generally Letter from Pholien & Tschoffen, June 6, 1940, supra 
note 38; Delpérée, supra note 39.  
 41. See Letter from Pholien & Tschoffen, June 6, 1940, supra note 38.  The 
nature and extent of the power to rule by way of these decrees would continue 
to vex not only the relations between the Germans and the Belgian governing 
authorities, but also the relations between these actors and the Belgian 
courts, which continued to insist that they had the authority to conduct judi-
cial review of the decisions of the Secretaries-General.  See, e.g., Anthoine et 
Consorts [PASICRISIE BELGE] [Cour de cassation] (Apr. 7, 1941) (Belgium); 
Halleux et Consorts [PASICRISIE BELGE] [Cour de cassation] (Mar. 30, 1942) 
(Belgium); Procureur du Roi de Nivelles, C. Malarme et Jacques [PASICRISIE 
BELGE] [Cour de cassation] (Jan. 27, 1943); Verhulst [PASICRISIE BELGE] [Cour 
de cassation] (Dec. 20, 1943).  See René Hanquet, LES POUVOIRS DES 
SECRETAIRES GENERAUX PENDANT L’OCCUPATION (1946). 
 42. See Letter from Pholien & Tschoffen, June 6, 1940, supra note 38. 
 43. See Le Protocole Allemand du 12 Juin 1940, in PIERRE LECLERCQ, 
L’EQUIVOQUE D’UNE LOI 65 (1946).   
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measures having the same effect as Belgian law under the laws 
and customs of war.44  
In early October 1940, the GMA in Belgium decided to intro-
duce measures regulating the legal status and rights of Jews.45  
On October 10, a meeting was held between the Secretary-
General for the Interior, Jean Vossen, and General Harry von 
Craushaar, deputy head of the GMA, to discuss the practical 
implementation of the German decision to introduce anti-
Jewish measures.  Von Craushaar informed his interlocutor 
that the Germans wanted the Belgian authorities to impose an 
order excluding Jews from public employment, registering Jews 
and their property, making compulsory signage indicating that 
certain businesses were “Jewish,” and forbidding all Jews who 
fled the country from returning.46  If local authorities refused to 
take these steps under Belgian law, the GMA threatened to re-
quire Vossen to enforce the decree.  If the Belgians still refused, 
the Germans would enforce the anti-Jewish measures them-
selves.47 
The Secretaries-General met the next day and, “after a brief 
exchange of views,” asked Vossen to convey their unanimous 
opinion to the Germans.48  On October 11, 1940, Vossen wrote to 
von Craushaar, outlining the legal position of the Belgian gov-
ernment: “[T]he Committee of Secretaries-General is of the 
opinion, after an in-depth examination, that it cannot, for con-
stitutional reasons, take on the responsibility for the measures 
envisioned concerning the Jews.”49  This statement is followed 
by a rather detailed description of the Belgian Constitution’s 
  
 44. TRIAL OF GERMAN MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 28, at 37 (“At the 
order of the Germans this administrative power after a time became a real 
legislative power.”).  
 45. See STEINBERG, LA QUESTION JUIVE, supra note 3, at 103–19. 
 46. Letter from Jean Vossen, Secretary-General for the Interior (Oct. 11, 
1940), Archives Jean Vossen, CEGES, Microfilm 74, at 78 (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Letter from Vossen, Oct. 
11, 1940]. 
 47. Minutes, Meeting of the Secretaries-General (Oct. 11, 1940) (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  
 48. Id. (“Après un bref échange de vues….”). 
 49. Letter from Vossen, Oct. 11, 1940, supra note 46 (“[L]e Comité des Se-
crétaires Généraux estime, après un examen approfondi, qu’il ne peut assu-
mer, pour des raisons d’ordre constitutionnel, la responsabilité des mesures 
envisagées à l’égard des juifs.”).  
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guarantee of equality and an outline of Article 43 of the Hague 
Convention, which permitted the Occupying Power to legislate 
itself.50  At first blush, this letter appears to demonstrate the 
beginnings of an administrative and governmental resistance to 
anti-Jewish measures based on a constitutional discourse of 
equality and the rule of law.  However, a closer examination of 
the language and meaning of this letter undermines such a su-
perficial analysis.  
First, Vossen (and the Secretaries-General as a body) used 
the term Juifs and not Israélites.  Use of the latter term might 
have emphasized their commitment to notions of Belgian citi-
zenship and equality as broadly understood and applicable.51  
Second, although Vossen and his colleagues said they could not, 
for constitutional reasons, assume the responsibility for anti-
Jewish measures, the letter goes on to assert that Germany 
does have the jurisdiction, as a matter of international law, to 
enact such measures.52  The Secretaries-General could have 
stated that domestic Belgian law, the Constitution, as well as 
the Hague Convention, all prohibited such discriminatory acts.  
Instead, they based their refusal on purely domestic grounds 
and yielded without protest to a German claim of jurisdiction to 
identify, record, and exclude Jewish individuals and busi-
nesses.53 
Article 43 of the Hague Convention permits the Occupier to 
introduce legally binding measures “to restore, and ensure, as 
far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless 
absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.”54  There-
fore, the Secretaries-General could have asserted that the 
Hague Convention did not permit the legalized persecution of 
Jews because such persecution is not a matter of public safety 
or national security.55  Instead, the Secretaries-General explic-
  
 50. Id.   
 51. See generally Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5 (concerning the 
linguistic differences between the terms Israélites and Juifs). 
 52. Letter from Vossen, Oct. 11, 1940, supra note 46. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Land and Customs of War 
on Land and its annex: Regulation concerning the Laws and Customs of War 
on Land, July 29, 1899, Annex, art. 43, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 (entered 
into force Sept. 4, 1900). 
 55. See id.   
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itly objected to Belgian anti-Jewish measures, not to anti-
Jewish measures in general.56  Under the Secretaries-General’s 
interpretation of the Hague Convention, German anti-Jewish 
legal measures would have the full force and effect of Belgian 
law and all Belgian government agencies would be bound 
thereby, notwithstanding the fact that the Belgian Constitution 
prohibited discrimination based in race or religion.57  
Faced with the prospect that the Germans would introduce 
anti-Jewish laws themselves and “charge the Department con-
cerned with the application of the decree,” the President of the 
Committee stated that “under these conditions, the Belgian 
administration could not avoid complying with the enforcement 
of such a decree.”58  Thus, while the Secretaries-General could 
not accept legislative responsibility by promulgating a Belgian 
order, they could not avoid administrative responsibility for en-
forcing a German decree against the Jews.  The juridical stage 
was set for the next series of legal positions and dispositions 
which would seal the fate of Belgian Jews and establish the 
lawful framework for a Belgian passive collaboration in enforc-
ing anti-Jewish measures. 
III. “THE DIRTY WORK” 59: THE CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMIZING 
OF ANTI-JEWISH LAW IN BELGIUM 
The Brussels administration’s involvement in the Holocaust 
began in earnest after the introduction of two explicitly anti-
Jewish orders in 1940.  However, full understanding of Belgian 
involvement in “the Jewish question” begins earlier, with the 
influx of Jews into Belgium, and the policing system for aliens 
(Police des Étrangers).60   
  
 56. See Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 258. 
 57. See id. at 258–59. 
 58. Minutes, Meeting of the Secretaries-General (Oct. 25, 1940) (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“M. le Président fait obser-
ver que, dans ces conditions, l’administration belge ne peut se soustraire à la 
mise en pratique de l’ordonnance susdite.”). 
 59. PIERRE STÉPHANY, 1940: 366 JOURS DE L’HISTOIRE DE BELGIQUE ET 
D’AILLEURS 337 (1990) (“And in implementing these measures, it had to be the 
Belgians who did the dirty work.”) (“Et dans la mise en oeuvre de ces mesures, 
il aurait fallu que ce soient les Belges qui fassent le sale travail.”).   
 60. See generally LES JUIFS EN BELGIQUE: DE L’IMMIGRATION AU GENOCIDE 
(Rudi van Doorslaer ed., 1994). 
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One piece of official correspondence serves as a harbinger of 
what would follow.  On May 28, 1940, in the earliest days of the 
Occupation, the head of the Brussels public welfare agency 
wrote to the Mayor.  According to this agency, two Germans 
sent by the Military Command visited their office to inform 
them that German citizens, including Austrians and Sudeten 
Germans, should henceforth be sent to the German social assis-
tance office for medical care or other aid.61  Germans were to be 
treated and cared for by Germans and within the German Oc-
cupier’s bureaucratic and administrative structure.  This would 
not be particularly noteworthy, except for the imposed recogni-
tion by Belgian officials of the annexations of the Sudetenland 
and Austria.  One key word, however, marks this document as 
the precursor for events that would follow in the autumn: Ar-
yan.  Only Aryan Germans were covered by the instruction 
given to the Brussels government.62 
Two interrelated points of bureaucratic inscriptive practice 
are worth noting.  First, the Germans did not hesitate to con-
tact City bureaucrats directly to enforce anti-Jewish practices.  
Here, it is difficult to tell whether the City employees were 
merely reporting the German instructions or were requesting 
advice from elected decision-makers.  There was no specific re-
quest for instructions and the document is simply entitled a 
“note” for the Mayor.  In other words, the document merely 
passes on information between government agencies and im-
  
 61. Note pour Monsieur le Bourgmestre (May 28, 1940), Cabinet du 
Bourgmestre, AVB, File 937 (Commission d’assistance publique, 1940–1943) 
(on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Note 
pour Monsieur le Bourgmestre, May 28, 1940]. 
 62. Id.  German anti-Jewish legal norms were applied to Germans in Bel-
gium in other circumstances as well.  The War Damages Order, which regu-
lated compensation for German citizens seeking to recover war-related losses, 
required a statement of Aryan background in the claim form and the produc-
tion of proof of Aryan descent.  See Verordnung über die Entschädigung 
deutscher Staatsangehöriger für Kriegssachschäden [Kriegssachschäden-
Verordnung] [decree of 14 August 1940, Regulating the remuneration of 
German citizens for war damages to property], Question 1 F (Aug. 14, 1940), 
reprinted in VERORDNUNGSBLATT DES MILITÄRBEFEHLSHABER IN BELGIEN UND 
NORDFRANKREICH [Official Gazette of the Military Command in Belgium and 
north France] [hereinafter VERORDNUNGSBLATT] (Aug. 17, 1940). 
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plies, by silence, at least, that the welfare agency will comply 
with the German command.63 
Second, official correspondence of the Brussels administration 
replicates, without hesitation, the language of Nazi an-
tisemitism.  For example, “Aryan” is not a term recognized in 
the Belgian Constitution.  One might plausibly argue that the 
administrators were doing nothing more than replicating lan-
guage received from their German visitors, and were not adopt-
ing such terminology as their own.  Even this, however, is the 
“hermeneutic of acceptance.”64  The discursive and epistemologi-
cal universe of Nazi antisemitism became normalized within 
Belgian administrative practice.  
At the end of October 1940, the Germans introduced the first 
set of orders that were explicitly anti-Jewish.65  The first, called 
the “Jewish Decree” (Jodenverordening) offered a definition of 
the new legal subject, the “Jew,” banned Jews who had left Bel-
gium from returning, required the creation of a register of Jew-
ish individuals, and made compulsory the identification and 
  
 63. See Note pour Monsieur le Bourgmestre, May 28, 1940, supra note 61.  
At this point in time, it is difficult to determine the nature of this document 
and others like it because the files held by the City of Brussels are incomplete 
and in disarray.  The handwritten notation on this document indicates that it 
has been seen, but there appear to be no other documents dealing with the 
subject.  Nonetheless, it is clear from this one inter-office communication that 
some officials, including the Mayor, were aware that the Occupying Powers 
were applying German anti-Jewish legal norms in Brussels and that Brussels 
officials were expected to comply with such norms.  Id. 
 64. See generally Weisberg, supra note 23 (discussing the hermeneutic of 
acceptance). 
 65. Jews were also subjected to all general decrees introduced by the Ger-
mans.  For example, the Occupiers introduced a law forbidding ritual slaugh-
ter of animals, a prohibition which targeted observant Jews without specifi-
cally naming them.  See Verordnung zur Vermeidung von Tierquälerei beim 
Schlachten von Tieren [Decree Avoiding Unnecessary Suffering of Animals 
During Their Slaughter] (Oct. 23, 1940), reprinted in VERORDNUNGSBLATT 
(Oct. 25, 1940).  In addition, those Jews who were non-citizens, including the 
vast majority of Jews present in Belgium at the time, were subject to regula-
tions governing enemy property.  See Verordnung betreffend das feindliche 
Vermögen in den bestzten Gebieten der Niederlands, Belgiens, Luxemburgs 
und Frankreichs [Decree concerning enemy properties in the occupied 
territories of the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg and France] (May 23, 
1940), reprinted in VERORDNUNGSBLATT (June 17, 1940).   
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declaration of all businesses defined as “Jewish.”66  The second 
decree ordered the removal of public employees identified as 
“Jews” and forbade similarly defined individuals from practic-
ing as lawyers, teaching in public schools and universities, or 
from holding management positions in newspapers or radio; 
Jews were to be removed from these functions by December 31, 
1940.67  This order also charged the Belgian government with 
ensuring that the instructions for the anti-Jewish provisions 
were given to all concerned agencies.68 
At their meeting on November 8, 1940, just after the decrees 
were published, the Secretaries-General discussed not whether 
they should award civil service pensions to government employ-
ees who would lose their jobs because they were Jews, but also 
the more basic question of how would they know if a public ser-
vant was Jewish.69  The answer came from Secretary Vossen, 
who stated that “interested parties must make the declaration 
to the municipal administration.  If they do not make this dec-
laration, they will be liable for very severe penalties.  As a re-
sult, all the administrations must, within the limit of their ju-
  
 66. Verordening van 28 Oktober 1940, houdende maatregelen tegen de 
Joden (Jodenverordening) [Decree of 28 October 1940 concerning measures 
relating to Jews (First Jewish Decree)] (Oct. 28, 1940), reprinted in 
VERORDNUNGSBLATT (Nov. 5, 1940) [hereinafter Verordening van 28 Oktober 
1940, houdende maatregelen tegen de Joden].  Section 3(1) provided that ap-
propriate municipal officials would create and maintain a Register of Jews for 
all male individuals over the age of 15 identifiable as Jews.  Id. § 3(1).  This 
Register was to include an individual’s name, place and date of birth, address, 
profession, nationality and religion; it was also to include the same informa-
tion for the individual’s wife, parents and grandparents.  Id.  Additionally, the 
files of foreign Jews were to indicate how long each had lived in Belgium, as 
well as the location of their previous home.  Id.  In the event of a Jew’s change 
of residence, section 3(3) obligated the municipal authority to forward the 
individual’s files to the appropriate officials in the Jew’s new abode.  Id. § 3(4).    
Finally, section 3(4) required that the identity cards of registered Jews con-
tain mention that the individual was listed in the Register of Jews.  Id. § 3(4).  
 67. Verordnung über das Ausscheiden von Juden aus Aemtern und Stel-
lungen [Decree of 28 October 1940 concerning the removal of Jews from their 
positions and employment (Second Jewish Decree)], reprinted in 
VERORDNUNGSBLATT (Nov. 5, 1940) [hereinafter Verordnung über das Auss-
cheiden von Juden aus Aemtern und Stellungen] (Jewish schools and religious 
education were exempted from the operation of section three.).  
 68. Id. § 4. 
 69. Minutes, Meeting of the Secretaries-General (Nov. 8, 1940) (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).   
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risdiction, consider what steps to take.”70  Similarly, regarding 
pension benefits for dismissed employees, the Belgian govern-
ment “invite[d] the Jewish employees concerned (by the meas-
ures) to request their retirement.”71 
Two aspects of this correspondence are relevant in under-
standing the implementation of anti-Jewish laws by Belgian 
government actors, as well as the post-war construction of a 
passive collaboration paradigm.  First, the correspondence uses 
the passive voice and French reflexive verb construction: Jews 
must present themselves and request their registration.  This 
language effectively transforms the municipal employee who 
fills in the registration card into a mere transcriber of the will 
of the Jews themselves.72  Second, the Secretaries-General do 
not question whether they should implement the orders; they 
only discuss how they should be carried out.  There is no 
“should” (devraient), only a compulsion, “must” (doivent).  Thus, 
the die is cast for the highest Belgian officials.  Later in No-
vember, when the Germans requested that the Secretaries-
General create a model for the registration cards, the President 
of the Secretaries-General, Ernst de Bunswyck, informed his 
colleagues that he had already drafted a procedure for removing 
Jewish employees.  He reiterated that Jewish employees would 
present themselves, thus, “[t]here was no need [ ] for local au-
thorities to take steps for this registration.”73   
The themes repeat and reinforce.  Jews must declare them-
selves.  The use of the reflexive verb structure creates the image 
of the Secretaries-General as ethically, practically and legally 
  
 70. Id. (“[L]es intéressés doivent faire la déclaration à l’Administration 
communale.  S’ils ne font pas cette déclaration, ils sont passibles des peines 
les plus sévères.  En conséquence, les administrations devront, chacune dans 
la limite de leurs attributions, envisager quelles sont les mesures à prendre.”).   
 71. Minutes, Meeting of the Secretaries-General (Nov. 22, 1940) (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“d’inviter les agents juifs 
intéressés à demander leur mise à la retraite”). 
 72. The use of the French verbs s’exécuter and s’inscrire in Belgium’s offi-
cial presentation at the Nuremberg Trials semiotically illustrates that its 
officials were aware of their legal responsibility.  
 73. Minutes, Meeting of the Secretaries-General (Nov. 19, 1940) (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“Il rappelle que les person-
nes juives doivent faire elles-même [sic] leur déclaration à l’Administration 
communale, sous peine de se voir appliquer des sanctions les plus sévères.  Il 
n’y a donc pas lieu pour les administrations de s’occuper de cette inscription.”). 
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divorced from the processes of identification and segregation of 
Jews.  At the same time, however, interim Secretary-General 
Henri Charles Adam began drafting a series of instructions to 
municipalities throughout the country for the implementation 
of the registration process.74  Gone, as quickly and quietly as it 
came, was Baron de Bunswyck’s assertion that no steps needed 
to be taken by local government authorities because the Jews 
were responsible for registering themselves.  
Although by November 1940 the Secretaries-General seemed 
to have accepted the inevitable fate of their Jewish colleagues, 
they did seek advisory opinions on the constitutional validity of 
legal measures promulgated by the Permanent Council before 
they reached any final decisions on the modalities of implemen-
tation.75  In essence, the Permanent Council did nothing more 
than provide a more explicit legal basis for the position already 
adopted by the government well before the Council delivered its 
advice on November 21, 1940.76   
The first legal principle the Council discussed was the su-
premacy of the Belgian Constitution.77  The Council noted, in its 
letter to the Secretaries-General, that the provisions of Articles 
six and fourteen, which guaranteed equality and religious free-
dom, and Article 100, which assured judicial independence, 
were the textual embodiment of the Belgian state structure.78  
According to the Council, the racial and religious exclusions 
found in the anti-Jewish orders clearly violated these constitu-
  
 74. See Letter from Adam, Secretary-General, to Provincial Governors, 
Local Administration, Mayors & Councilors (Dec. 6, 1940) (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Letter from Adam to 
Provincial Governors, Dec. 6, 1940].   
 75. See, e.g., STEINBERG, UN PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES JUIFS, supra note 3, at 46–
51 (noting the importance played by the Permanent Council of Legislation in 
giving legitimacy to Belgian compliance with German anti-Jewish decrees).    
 76. Letter from R. Hayoit (de Termincourt), Secretary of the Permanent 
Council of Legislation, to the Secretary-General of Justice (Nov. 21, 1940), 
Archives Jean Vossen, CEGES, Microfilm 74 (on file with the Brooklyn Jour-
nal of International Law) [hereinafter Letter from Permanent Council of Leg-
islation, Nov. 21, 1940]. 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id.  These provisions “are the fundamental principles of our public law, 
situated as the very basis for our administrative and judicial organizations.”  
Id. (“sont des principes fondamentaux de notre droit public placés à la base 
même de notre organisation administrative et de notre organisation judi-
ciaire.”). 
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tional principles.  Therefore, as a matter of constitutional prin-
ciple and criminal law, the Council concluded that “participa-
tion in these decrees clearly exceeds the legal power of the Sec-
retaries-General and of all public servants, since it would con-
stitute a breach of their oath of loyalty to the Constitution….”79 
This assertion could have served as the basis for a “jugular”—
a constitutionally based refusal by the highest authorities to 
enforce the measures set out in the decrees.80  After denouncing 
participation as contrary to the Belgian Constitution, however, 
the letter defines it in such a way as to provide a textual basis 
for passive collaboration.  The Council wrote that “[t]he person 
in relation to whom, or against whom a measure is taken by the 
Occupying Power and who, under the compulsion on which the 
Authority bases its power, completes the material act imposed 
by the law, submits to the provision, he does not participate 
therein.”81  The result is that, as matter of law, submission to 
the legal compulsion which accompanies these decrees is not 
“participation,” and, therefore, not a violation of the Constitu-
tion.82  
The Permanent Council’s letter then expands and clarifies its 
position regarding compliant Belgian officials: 
  
 79. Id. (“[L]a participation à ces ordonnances excède manifestement le 
pouvoir lègal de MM. les Secrétaires généraux et de tous les fonctionnaires, 
puisqu’elle constituerait la violation de leur serment d’obéissance à la Consti-
tution....”). 
 80. See Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 263–67 (Indeed, Louis 
Braffort, President of the Brussels Bar, adopted this position during the Oc-
cupation. Invoking the Constitution, Braffort refused to hand over a list of 
names identifying his colleagues as Jews.  When the Germans insisted that he 
provide them with the entire list of the Bar’s membership, he refused to com-
ply by failing to compile a list of lawyers for that period.). 
 81. Letter from Permanent Council of Legislation, Nov. 21, 1940, supra 
note 76 (“Celui à l’égard de qui ou contre qui une mesure est prise par 
l’autorité occupante et qui, sous la contrainte sur laquelle s’appuie cette auto-
rité, accomplit l’aote matériel qu’elle loi impose, subit la mesure, il n’y parti-
cipe pas.”).   
 82. See, e.g., STEINBERG, LA PERSÉCUTION DES JUIFS, supra note 3; 
STEINBERG, 1942 LES CENT JOURS, supra note 3; STEINBERG, LA QUESTION JUIVE, 
supra note 3; STEINBERG, LA TRAQUE DES JUIFS, supra note 3; STEINBERG, UN 
PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES JUIFS, supra note 3.  As Steinberg so powerfully argues in 
his works, this theory makes the Belgian government the first and primary 
victim of Nazi antisemitism.   
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[T]he following are not acts of illegal participation: the sub-
mission of persons defined in § 1 of the 1st decree to the prohi-
bitions and obligations imposed on them by §§ 2 and 3, para-
graph 2, § 14 of the 1st decree and § 1 of the 2nd decree); sub-
mission to § 9 of the 1st decree; keeping a Register of Jews by 
municipal or local administrations as a result of the spontane-
ous declarations of interested parties (§ 3 of the 1st decree); 
the posting of signs by municipal authorities requested from 
them by interested parties pursuant to § 14 of this decree.83 
“Passive” submission to the Occupying Power was permissible 
and permitted, but “active” participation was still clearly in vio-
lation of the basic norms and fundamental principles of the Bel-
gian constitutional state.84  In addition to the theme of passive 
collaboration, the Permanent Council adopted the idea that the 
Register would be compiled on the basis of declarations of “in-
  
 83. Letter from Permanent Council of Legislation, Nov. 21, 1940, supra 
note 76  
(Ainsi, à l’estime du comité permanent, ne sont pas des actes de par-
ticipation interdite: la soumission des personnes, désignées au § 1 de 
la 1ère ordonnance, aux interdictions et aux obligations qui leur sont 
imposées aux §§ 2 et 3, alinéa 2, § 14  de la 1ère ordonnance, § 1 de la 
2 de ordonnance), la soumission au § 9 de la 1ère ordonnance, la te-
nue du registre des Juifs par les administrations communales ou les 
commissaires d’arrondissement sur les déclarations spontanément 
faites par les intéressés (§ 3 de la 1ère ordonnance), l’affichage  par 
les administrations communales requis auprès d’elles par les intéres-
sés, conformément au § 14 de cette ordonnance.). 
 84. See id.  The Council distinctly prohibited active participation:  
[A]ny initiative, all investigations or complementary steps, with the 
aim of ensuring the full efficacy of any of the provisions of the decrees 
by Belgian public servants is forbidden. The taking of such an initia-
tive or such steps would mean no longer being compelled to submit to 
the enforcement of the decrees, but would be their promotion, and as 
a consequence would mean participating in the transformation of our 
public law.   
Id.  
(Par contre, toute initiative, toutes investigations ou mesures com-
plémentaires, dans le but d’assurer la pleine efficacité de l’une ou 
l’autre disposition des ordonnances, est interdite aux fonctionnaires 
belges.  Prendre une telle initiative ou une telle mesure, ce ne serait 
plus subir l’exécution des ordonnances, ce serait le promouvoir et, par 
conséquent, participer à la transformation de notre droit public.).   
The Secretaries-General finalized the modalities of passive collaboration dur-
ing their meetings on December 3 and 6, 1940. 
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terested parties,” and the signage for Jewish businesses would 
be “requested of them by the interested parties.”85  To the Secre-
taries-General, the Permanent Council, and the post-war recon-
structionists, passive collaboration was not unconstitutional or 
un-Belgian, but rather, faithful in its grammatical construction, 
rhetorical deployment, and practical implementation to the 
highest norms of public service and the constitutional rule of 
law. 
The taxonomical question concerns collaboration and its con-
comitant mirror image, resistance, in Holocaust history.  While 
the divisions between active believers in the New Order and 
those who took up arms against the German invaders are fairly 
unambiguous, passive collaboration is the “grey area [where] 
bystanders confront the risk of becoming accessories to the devil 
and turning into perpetrators.”86 
IV. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DETAILS 
A micro-level examination of the implementation of the Jew-
ish decrees in Belgium is helpful in understanding the role and 
self-characterization of Belgian officials.87  This grey area of 
  
 85. Id. (“requis auprès d’elles par les intéressés”). 
 86. Zygmunt Bauman, From Bystander to Actor, 2 J. HUM. RTS. 137, 137 
(2003). 
 87. See generally LUC HUYSE & STEVEN DHONDT, LA REPRESSION DES 
COLLABORATIONS 1942–1952 (1993); Ganshof van der Meersch, Réflexions sur 
la répression des crimes contre la sureté extérieure de l’état belge, 2 REVUE DE 
DROIT PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 7 (1946–47); M. H. Bekaert, Problèmes so-
ciaux de l’incivisme, 2 REVUE DE DROIT PENAL ET DE CRIMINOLOGIE 203 (1946–
47).  The construction of post-war repression reflected complex notions of, and 
conflicts over, Belgian identity and citizenship.  French-speaking Belgians 
understood the necessity of punishing anti-Belgian Flemish collaborators and 
bemoaned the process of reconciliation and amnesty which followed.  Mean-
while, the Flemish understanding of collaboration differed sharply from that 
of their Walloon fellow citizens, who seemed blind to their own history of col-
laboration.  See generally COLLABORATION, REPRESSION: UN PASSE QUI RESISTE 
(José Gotovitch & Chantal Kesteloot eds., 2002).  All parties, however, no 
matter how flawed their actions, shared the foundational notion that collabo-
ration was illegal.  For a more detailed discussion of the postwar trials, see 
Martin Conway, Justice in Postwar Belgium: Popular Passions and Political 
Realities, in THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE: WORLD WAR II AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 133 (István Deák et al. eds., 2000); Luc Huyse, The Criminal Jus-
tice System as a Political Actor in Regime Transitions: The Case of Belgium, 
1944–50, in THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION IN EUROPE: WORLD WAR II AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 157 (István Deák et al. eds., 2000). 
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obedience, compliance, and self-described passivity embodies 
the very dilemma of law and legality during the Holocaust.88  
From the earliest negotiations concerning the role of the Bel-
gian state apparatus in applying anti-Jewish measures, Belgian 
collaboration was never “collaboration” in the legal sense.  Nev-
ertheless, Jewish persecution in Belgium was embedded in a 
complex matrix of law and legality; it was not a momentary 
rupture from the rule of law or a descent into unmitigated bar-
barity.89  As the actions of Belgian officials demonstrate, the 
Holocaust in Belgium could not have happened without munici-
pal officials registering, identifying and excluding the Jewish 
population of Brussels under the protective cover of a self-
justifying legality. 
A certain ambiguity in the process of registration and exclu-
sion of Jews in Brussels has been used to characterize their ac-
tions as resistance.  One example is the response to Secretary-
General Adam’s letter in December 1940.  When referring to the 
type of card to be used in the Register of Jews, Secretary-
General Adam stated that “[t]he German Military Authority 
has decided that unless enforcement measures have already 
been taken, the system put into place by the towns of the Brus-
sels area must be adopted in the whole country.”90 
The response from Brussels to Adam’s letter was vociferous.  
Georges Pêtre, Mayor of the municipality of Saint-Josse-ten-
Noode, wrote to the Mayor of Brussels, Joseph Van de Meule-
broeck, to protest the dangerous misunderstanding of the City’s 
position regarding implementation of the anti-Jewish orders.91  
  
 88. See generally DAVID FRASER, LAW AFTER AUSCHWITZ: TOWARDS A 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE HOLOCAUST (forthcoming 2005). 
 89. See Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 258.  The City of Brus-
sels’ history with anti-Jewish laws illustrates both the legacy of collaboration 
and persecution in Belgium and the argument that law can be found at the 
core of the Holocaust.  The Shoah was constituted in constitutional discourses 
and lawful practices and the Brussels example embodies this.  See id. 
 90. Letter from Adam to Provincial Governors, Dec. 6, 1940, supra note 74 
(“L’autorité militaire allemande décide qu’à moins que des mesures 
d’exécution aient été déjà prises, le système mis en pratique par les communes 
de l’agglomération bruxelloise doit être adopté dans tout le pays.”). 
 91. Letter from Georges Pêtre, Mayor of Saint-Josse-ten-Noode, to Van de 
Meulebroeck, Mayor of Brussels (Dec. 7, 1940), AVB, Guerre 40–45 (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  
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Pêtre characterized the orders as blatantly unconstitutional.92  
At its meeting on December 10, the regional Conference of 
Mayors discussed the issue and decided to write to Secretary-
General Adam.  Van de Meulebroeck, in his capacity as leader 
of the Conference of Mayors for the Brussels region, sent an 
angry reply to Adam, attacking the wording of the December 6 
letter.93  He wrote: 
Without question, certain municipal employees have together 
drawn up a model card [fiche] for the eventuality of the appli-
cation of the German decree … but the Mayors, meeting to-
gether in Conference, have in no way adopted the model, nor 
have they taken a decision for its use in their area.  On the 
contrary, taking into account that Paragraph 16 of the Ger-
man decree of 28 October stipulates that “the head of the gen-
eral military administration will decide the necessary provi-
sions in order to carry out and to complete this decree,” the 
Mayors decided to wait until the necessary provisions for the 
application of the decree of 28 October had been set out, to de-
cide on their position.  They have become aware of the publica-
tion of these provisions only by way of your aforementioned 
letter.  They wish to underline that they will only apply these 
instructions because they are compelled and forced to do so.94 
  
 92. Id. 
 93. See generally Delplancq, Des paroles et des actes, supra note 2 (discuss-
ing possible interpretations of the Mayor’s response). 
 94. Letter from Van de Meulebroeck, Mayor of Brussels, to the Secretary-
General of the Interior (Dec. 13, 1940), USHMM, RG. 65.003P, Reel 430 (on 
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Letter from 
Van de Meulebroeck to Secretary-General, Dec. 13, 1940] 
(Sans doute, certains employés communaux ont rédigé, de concert, 
une formule de fiche signalétique sous l’éventualité de la mise en ap-
plication de l’ordonnance allemande…, mais les bourgmestres, réunis 
en conférence, n’ont nullement adopté ce projet, ni décidé son utilisa-
tion dans leur commune.  Tout au contraire, constatant que le para-
graphe 16 de l’ordonnance allemande du 28 octobre stipule que “le 
chef de l’administration générale militaire arrêtera les prescriptions 
nécessaires, afin d’exécuter et de compléter la présente ordonnance” 
ils ont décidé d’attendre que les prescriptions nécessaires afin 
d’exécuter l’ordonnance du 28 octobre soient édictées pour fixer leur 
attitude.  Or, ils n’ont eu connaissance de la publication des prescrip-
tions en question que par votre circulaire précitée.  Ils tiennent à sou-
ligner qu’ils n’appliqueront ces instructions que contraints et forcés 
[sic].). 
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Although the Conference of Mayors objected to the rush to en-
force the anti-Jewish orders, Van de Meulebroeck’s letter points 
out that the authority and order for compliance came from both 
the Secretaries-General and the Germans, and that the City of 
Brussels was simply complying with hierarchical demands.95  
The Mayor asserted the official Brussels’ position, seeking to 
position the City as a passive collaborator acting only under 
instruction and compulsion.96  What is intriguing is that Pêtre’s 
assertion, that the decrees violated the Belgian Constitution, 
disappeared in the interval between his letter to Van de Meule-
broeck and the latter’s response on behalf of all his colleagues 
several days later.  What happened?  
There is no doubt that the decrees violated any number of 
provisions guaranteeing equality and liberty under the Belgian 
Constitution; that was never the legal question facing either the 
Secretaries-General or the local officials.  The legal framing of 
relevant inquiry, rather, was shifted from whether the anti-
Jewish measures were constitutional to whether Belgian law 
limited their application.  When did participation become 
participation punishable by law?  
On the same day he wrote the letter of protest to the Secre-
tary-General, Van de Meulebroeck posted the public notice to 
all Jews about the registration process.97  The temporal coinci-
dence of the two documents appears to undermine the mytho-
logical claim of passivity and compulsion.  On November 12, one 
week after the publication of the decrees in the Verordnungs-
blatt, the Director of the Office of the Register of Births, Deaths, 
and Marriages wrote to the Conference of Mayors, raising for 
their consideration a series of practical legal questions relating 
to application of the decrees.98 
  
 95. Id. 
 96. Id.  
 97. Ordre de Service No 1979, Ordonnance du 28-10-40 relative aux func-
tions et activités exercées par les Juifs (Dec. 12, 1940), Cabinet du Bourgmes-
tre, AVB (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter 
Ordre de Service No 1979, Dec. 12, 1940]. 
 98.  Rapport au Collège (Nov. 12, 1940), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, 
File 866 bis (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  Those 
questions were: 
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While the Conference of Mayors (Conference) may not have 
made a binding legislative or quasi-judicial decision regarding 
the Register of Jews, it was intimately involved in the construc-
tion of the bureaucratic process and mechanisms by which Bel-
gian civil servants were to register the Jews of Brussels.99  Re-
cords throughout Belgium demonstrate that many municipali-
ties were well ahead of the Secretaries-General in putting into 
place a bureaucracy for identification and exclusion of Jews.  In 
fact, a review of registration documents from municipalities 
other than Brussels shows that different forms were used 
  
1. What department will be charged with keeping the Register of 
Jews?  Will it be the Police, Religious Affairs or the Registry of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages? 
2. Is it appropriate to invite Jews by public notice, to present them-
selves for registration to the office of the competent department? 
3. On the other hand, given that the decree in questions says in arti-
cle 16 that the Head of the Military Administration will issue edicts 
containing the necessary rules for the application and completion of 
this decree, should we ask for complementary instructions from the 
German Authority? 
4. If need be, can the designated department call together delegates 
for the towns of greater Brussels in order to transmit to them any in-
formation compiled in order to ensure uniformity in applying the de-
cree? 
Id.  
1° Quel service sera chargé de la tenue du registre des Juifs?  Sera-
ce la Police, les Cultes ou l’Etat civil? 
2° Convient-il d’inviter les Juifs par affiche, à se présenter pour ins-
cription au Bureau compétent? 
3° Ou bien, étant donné que l’ordonnance dont il s’agit dit dans son 
article 16 que le Chef de l’administration militaire arrêtera les pres-
criptions nécessaires afin d’exécuter et de compléter la présente or-
donnance, y a-t-il lieu de demander des instructions complémentaires 
à l’Autorité allemande?  
4° Le cas échéant, le Service désigné pourra- t-il réunir les délégués 
des communes pour leur transmettre les renseignements recueillis 
afin d’arriver a l’uniformité d’application?). 
 99. See, e.g., Ordre de Service No 1979, Dec. 12, 1940, supra note 97.  The 
Germans subsequently indicated that Brussels’ bilingual registration formula 
was to be adopted by other municipalities unless registration had already 
begun.  See Letter from Adam to Provincial Governors, Dec. 6, 1940, supra 
note 74.  
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throughout the country.  This indicates, therefore, either an 
overt refusal to adopt the Brussels form, or more likely, as the 
Adam letter recognized, that steps to register Jews in various 
municipalities were already underway before the Permanent 
Council issued its verdict on the legal limits of local compliance. 
By November 12 1940, the Conference had already taken 
steps to implement the registration process and did not feel 
compelled to await German instructions.100  Six days later, the 
Conference met again to establish, in further detail, the way 
information concerning the Jews of Brussels would be entered 
into the Register.  Eleven separate decisions concerning the reg-
istration process were taken at this meeting.101  The assembled 
Mayors decided that, as a matter of policy and practice, they 
would immediately put the decree into effect without involving 
themselves in its application.  They would not “send away for a 
later date, Jews who present themselves for inclusion on the ad 
hoc register.  The Administration has not at this time the task 
of determining who should be considered a Jew according to the 
decree.”102  
This declaration demonstrates the city’s willingness to com-
ply with the impending deadline imposed by the order, even in 
  
 100. Note pour Monsieur le Bourgmestre (Nov. 21, 1940), USHMM, RG 
65.003P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) 
[hereinafter Note pour Monsieur le Bourgmestre, Nov. 21, 1940].  The docu-
ment states:   
The Conference, in its meeting of 12 November, decided that the Reg-
ister of Jews will be, as you know, kept by the Office of the Register of 
Births, Deaths and Marriages.  The Conference was of the opinion 
that it was not necessary to request complementary instructions from 
the German Authority, and that the opening of the Register should 
take place in any event. 
Id. (“Le Collège, en sa séance du 12 novembre, a décidé que le registre des 
Juifs sera, comme vous le savez, tenu par l’Etat civil. Il a estimé qu’il ne 
convenait pas de demander des instructions complémentaires à l’autorité al-
lemande, mais qu’il y avait néanmoins lieu d’ouvrir le registre.”).  
 101. Conférence du 16 novembre 1940, relative à l’ordonnance en date du 28 
octobre 1940 concernant les mesures contre les juifs, Cabinet du Bourgmestre, 
AVB, File 866 bis (Nov. 16, 1940) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law) [hereinafter Conférence du 16 novembre 1940].  
 102. Id. para. 1 (“Ne pas renvoyer à une date ultérieure les Juifs qui se pré-
senteraient pour se faire inscrire sur le registre ad hoc.  L’Administration n’a 
pas pour l’instant la mission d’établir qui doit être considéré comme Juif au 
sens de l’Ordonnance.”).  
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the absence of further instructions from the GMA or the Secre-
taries-General.103  Without official guidelines as to which proce-
dure and format to follow, Brussels enacted ad hoc measures in 
order to comply with the order:  
[A]s a result, the inscription placed by the Municipal Popula-
tion Office on the identity card must not allow it to be believed 
or to be asserted that the administration has classified some-
one as a Jew.  It must appear clearly that it is the interested 
party who has come to declare himself.104 
Decisions made at the November 16 meeting also involved 
uniting into one register the records of Jews who “entered 
themselves” at the Municipal Records Office and those whose 
files were found in the Office of Aliens (Bureau des Étrangers).105  
To engage in such an endeavor, Belgian officials must have 
looked for religious indicia in the files of the Office of Aliens.  
Since the Belgian Constitution guaranteed republican citizen-
ship, no one would have been entered in these files as a “Jew.”  
Some form of investigation for the improved efficacy of the de-
cree was required.  The assembled Mayors also decided to mark 
the records of individuals identified as Jewish with the letter 
“J” in the Municipal Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages, 
as well as the Office of Aliens records.106  Nowhere in the Ger-
man decree is such a step required as a matter of law.  Thus, 
  
 103. Id. paras. 3, 4, & 5.  “For each Jew who presents himself and comes to 
declare himself, a provisional file card will be established.  This file card will 
be completed later in the manner indicated by occupying authority.  The Po-
pulation Offices will take no other initiative.”  Id. (“Pour tout Juif qui se pré-
sente et vient se déclarer, une fiche provisoire sera établie.  Cette fiche sera 
complétée ultérieurement dans le sens qui nous sera indiqué par l’ordonnance 
de l ‘autorité occupants.  Les bureaux de Population ne prendront pas d’autre 
initiative.”). 
 104.  Note entitled “Ne pas inscrire simplement ‘Juif’” (Nov. 15, 1940), Ca-
binet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 bis (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law) (“[I]l résulte que l’inscription faite par les bureaux de la 
population sur la carte d’identité ne peut pas faire croire ni permettre de sou-
tenir que l’administration a désigné quelqu’un comme juif.  Il faut 
qu’apparaisse clairement que c’est l’intéressé qui est venu se déclarer.”).  
While § 4 of the Jewish order required the marking of the identity card of 
registered Jews, it sets out only that the registration itself be mentioned.  See 
Verordening van 28 Oktober 1940, houdende maatregelen tegen de Joden, 
supra note 66.  
 105. Conférence du 16 novembre 1940, supra note 101, para. 6. 
 106. Id. para. 8.  
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the highest elected officials in the Brussels region undertook 
this measure without instructions from the GMA or the Secre-
taries-General.   
All of this decision-making seems to have occurred in an at-
mosphere of urgency and with a desire to efficiently establish 
the registration machinery:  
As a result, since the declarations must be made before 30 No-
vember … one of our civil servants telephoned the Ministry of 
the Interior, in order to learn if any decision or instructions 
were to be given.  The response was negative.  Today, how-
ever, it would appear that that Department has decided to 
take an interest in the question because M. Warans, head of 
the Population Department, was requested to send a copy of 
the model card which was designed by your Departments and 
adopted by the delegates of the various towns of the region, at 
a meeting at the City Hall last Saturday, presided over by 
Councilor Verhaeghe de Naeyer.107 
At some point after this flurry of activity, however, the May-
ors of the Brussels region had a change of heart.  At their No-
vember 21 meeting, they decided to await further instructions 
from the Occupying Authority before making any definitive de-
  
 107. Note pour Monsieur le Bourgmestre, Nov. 21, 1940, supra note 100 
(En conséquence, comme les déclarations doivent être faites avant le 
30 novembre…un fonctionnaire de notre Administration a téléphoné 
au Ministère de l’Intérieur, afin de savoir si une décision quelconque 
ou des directives allaient être données.  La réponse a été négative.  
Aujourd’hui cependant, il semblerait que le dit Département a décidé 
de s’intéresser à la question, car, M. Warans, Chef de la Population, a 
été prié de faire parvenir le modèle de feuille qui a été établi par vos 
Services et adopté par les délégués de toutes les communes de 
l’agglomération, réunis à l’Hôtel de Ville samedi dernier sous la pré-
sidence de M. l’Echevin Verhaeghe de Naeyer.). 
Verhaeghe de Naeyer presided over the meeting on Nov. 16, 1940; the Council 
reached eleven decisions regarding the practical implementation of the anti-
Jewish decree.  Conférence du 16 novembre 1940, supra note 101.  Addition-
ally, Germans contacted various municipal authorities to ensure that the 
processes of registration and signage for Jewish businesses were proceeding 
according to plan.  See Letter from Houtart, Governor of Brabant, to the Sec-
retary-General for the Interior (Nov. 28, 1940), Archives Houtart, CEGES, 
Microfilm 79 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  
Stadtkämmer Kahn, the Occupation official in charge of relations with the 
City of Brussels, was informed in late November of 1940, before the Dec. 6 
letter and the Dec. 13 protest, that the register was ready.  Id.  
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cisions.  Indeed, instead of entering Jews in an ad hoc register, 
the Mayors decided to grant any Jew presenting himself for reg-
istration a note indicating that he had done so, but could not be 
registered because no instructions had been received from the 
Occupying Authorities.108  There can be little doubt that this 
backtracking by the Conference of Mayors coincided with the 
constitutional opinion of the Permanent Council.  
This is the “legal” reason informing the letter of protest sent 
by Van de Meulebroeck on December 13, 1940.  Once the consti-
tutionally-recognized taxonomy of participation was estab-
lished, it became evident to elected officials that there would be, 
at the very least, serious doubts regarding their decision-
making process.  By their own records, it appears that adminis-
trative officials set up their own administrative structures and 
arrangements for the registration process without referring any 
further questions to the Germans.  If so, their actions arguably 
violated not only their oaths of office, but their legal obligations 
as elected officials.109 
  
 108. Séance de la Conférence des Bourgmestres de l’Agglomération Bruxel-
loise du 21 Novembre 1940, 66me séance, Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 
866 bis (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter 
Séance de la Conférence des Bourgmestres, Nov. 21, 1940] (“Provisoirement, 
on pourrait donner acte aux juifs de ce qu’ils se sont présentés et que, faute 
d’instructions, ils n’ont pas encore pu être inscrits.”).  See also Note pour Mon-
sieur l’Echevin Coelst: Registre des Juifs from the Director of the Office of the 
Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages (Nov. 21, 1940) (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Handwritten note replying to Note 
pour Monsieur l’Echevin Coelst: Registre des Juifs from the Director of the 
Office of the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages (on file with the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law). 
 109. I am not suggesting that compliance and resignation were the univer-
sal reality.  In January 1942, the Office of the Secretary-General of the Inte-
rior informed local officials that the Germans were unhappy with their re-
sponse to the Jewish registration requirement; certain municipalities had 
failed to send information to the Security Police.  Brussels officials made in-
ternal inquiries and informed the Secretary-General that the City of Brussels 
had complied with the obligations imposed by the order.  See Letter from 
Croonenberghs (Jan. 22, 1942), USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Letter from Joostens to Coelst 
(Jan. 26, 1942), USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law); Letter from Coelst to Romsée (Jan. 27, 1942), 
USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law).  Municipal compliance to, and resistance against, the Jewish 
registration requirement is one area of Belgian history in need of clarification.  
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Two aspects of this correspondence are relevant to the my-
thology of resistance.  First, employees directly responsible to 
the Mayor, not just “certain municipal employees” as Van de 
Meulebroeck asserted in his December 13 letter, constructed 
the standardized form for the registration of Jews.110  Second, 
the November 21 memo to Van de Meulebroeck demonstrates 
the early legal conceptualization of Jews as active parties.  
Questioned during post-war investigations about possible illegal 
collaboration by government officials during the Occupation, 
the Mayor of Brussels stated for the legal and historical record 
that: 
As far as my own case is concerned, I consented to the opening 
of the Register on which Jews had to enter their names pursu-
ant to the decree, because I considered that they had the 
choice of registering themselves or not.  They had this choice 
of complying or not complying with the decree.  I had received 
requests from several Jews wishing to register themselves in 
order to be in compliance.  Only one Jew wrote me a protest 
letter.111 
  
What does seem clear, however, is that Brussels was not a hotbed of resis-
tance. 
 110. See Letter from Van de Meulebroeck to Secretary-General, Dec. 13, 
1940, supra note 94.  Other records establish that the Mayors were ready, 
willing and able to proceed with an ad hoc registration form using provisional 
documentation.  Careful discussions ensued about how best to process regis-
tration, i.e., the stamping of each Jew’s identity cards so that it would appear 
that registration had occurred at the behest of the Jews themselves.  See 
Séance de la Conférence des Bourgmestres, Nov. 21, 1940, supra note 108.  
 111. Interrogation of Van de Meulebroeck before Emile Janson (Jan. 3, 
1945), Archives Houtart, CEGES, Microfilm 79 (on file with the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law)   
(En ce qui me concerne, j’ai consenti à ouvrir le registre sur lequel les 
juifs devaient s’inscrire aux termes de l’ordonnance, parce que j’ai 
considéré qu’ils avaient la faculté de s’y inscrire ou de ne pas s’y ins-
crire.  Ils conservaient donc la faculté de se soumettre ou de ne pas se 
soumettre à l’ordonnance.  J’avais reçu des demandes de certains 
juifs qui désiraient s’inscrire pour se mettre en règle.  Un seul juif 
m’a écrit une lettre de protestation.). 
Here, Van de Meulebroeck uses small grammatical distinctions to demons-
trate his passive collaboration in the registration of the Jews of Brussels.  
When explaining his “consent” to the opening of the Register of Jews, Van de 
Meulebroeck uses the past perfect tense j’ai consenti; when attributing active 
agency to Jews, however, he employs the pluperfect j’avais reçu.  See id.   
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Two patterns of bureaucratic self-legitimizing are apparent.  
On the one hand, it appears that Belgian officials engaged in 
repeated preparation and decision-making regarding the Regis-
ter of Jews.  On the other, there is a consistent semiotic con-
struction of the process as one in which Jews actively partici-
pated and bureaucrats of Brussels simply concretized their 
wishes to be identified for the German Occupiers.  After the No-
vember 21 letter from the Permanent Council, many of the pre-
paratory acts were put on hold pending instructions from the 
Germans but, interestingly, the construction of passivity con-
tinued in official documents.112  
V.  THE SECOND ORDER AND JEWISH EMPLOYEES IN THE CITY OF 
BRUSSELS  
The ambit of bureaucratic involvement extended beyond the 
registration of individuals and businesses.  The second order of 
October 28, 1940, banned Jews from public service and from 
certain professions, including the law.113  Section four of the or-
der placed the responsibility for the enforcement of the provi-
sions excluding Jews on the relevant offices of the public ad-
ministration.  On January 3, 1941, the National Institute for 
Radio Broadcasting asked the officer in charge of public records 
in the First District of Brussels to supply him with the birth 
certificates of six named employees “in order to permit me to 
comply with the enforcement of the present legislation concern-
ing Jews….”114 
This letter, written by a municipal employee, carries a hand-
written annotation, “Aryan origin” (origine aryenne).115  It is not 
  
 112. Letter from Permanent Council of Legislation, Nov. 21, 1940, supra 
note 76.  Van de Meulebroeck’s letter and post-war testimony may have been 
an attempt to “salt” the judicial files by creating an official correspondence 
between the Brussels’ officials and the Secretaries-General demonstrating the 
officials’ non-compliance with the German order and their status as “passive 
collaborators” under Belgian law.  
 113. Verordnung über das Ausscheiden von Juden aus Aemtern und 
Stellungen, supra note 67, § 1 (“Direktoren und Schriftleiter in Presse und 
Radiofunkunternehmen....”).   
 114. Letter from Brussels’ Civil Officer, First District (Jan. 3, 1941), Cabinet 
du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 bis (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of In-
ternational Law) (“Pour me permettre de me conformer à l’application de la 
législation actuelle concernant les juifs....”).  
 115. Id. 
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possible to determine if that notation refers to the results of the 
search of the birth records or if it simply makes reference to a 
topic for administrative filing purposes.  Regardless, the nota-
tion represents the adoption of the racial language of Nazism by 
employees of the City of Brussels as a matter of bureaucratic 
routine. 
There were, of course, grey areas of legal application for Bel-
gian authorities.  One of the most vexing areas for local bureau-
crats arose from the interaction between registration under the 
first anti-Jewish order and the second order targeting Jewish 
employees.  How, for example, could one who believed he was 
not a Jew have proven it?116  In addition to the technical legal 
question of how to prove one’s non-Jewish origins, two subsidi-
ary questions also arose.117  First, to whom did one make this 
proof and, second, how did one who successfully established 
non-Jewish status obtain removal from the list of registered 
Jews? 
In Belgium, Jews were defined and registered in late 1940 
and early 1941 under the legal regime established by German 
decrees and “administered” by the Belgian state apparatus in 
accordance with the norms of acceptable participation set out in 
the opinion of the Permanent Council.118  The orders are silent 
as to any notion of jurisdiction, and provide no guidance for es-
tablishing administrative mechanisms to deal with cases of le-
  
 116. See Verordening van 28 Oktober 1940, houdende maatregelen tegen de 
Joden, supra note 66.  The order, in defining “Jew” as a legal category, pro-
vided that anyone with three Jewish grandparents was a Jew.  Id. § 1(1).  The 
second order stated that when there was doubt about an individual’s Jewish 
origins, that individual would be treated as a Jew until the question could be 
determined definitively.  Verordnung über das Ausscheiden von Juden aus 
Aemtern und Stellungen, supra note 67, § 2(2). 
 117. I am aware that this is precisely the type of unethical question that 
Richard Weisberg labels the “hermeneutic of acceptance” and which he finds 
repugnant.  I do not disagree, but feel obliged to explain and examine these 
issues because they did arise. See generally Weisberg, supra note 23. 
 118. Letter from Permanent Council of Legislation, Nov. 21, 1940, supra 
note 76.  In France, a complex bureaucratic system under the jurisdiction of 
the General Commission for Jewish Questions (Commissariat Général aux 
Questions Juives) was established under French law.  The General Commis-
sion conducted investigations and issued certificates attesting that certain 
individuals were not Jewish.  The French system could operate as it did be-
cause its anti-Jewish laws were pieces of domestic legislation.  See RICHARD 
WEISBERG, VICHY LAW AND THE HOLOCAUST IN FRANCE 2 (1996).  
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gally problematic Jewishness.  This was the result of the GMA’s 
deliberate decision in Brussels.  On January 28, 1941, German 
officials in Belgium explained their position to their Parisian 
colleagues as follows: 
The above definitions have been left out of the Jewish decree 
of the Military Command in Belgium and the North of France, 
because they are not relevant to the implementation of the 
Belgian Jewish orders, and because, in the interest of facilitat-
ing their implementation by Belgian authorities, every unnec-
essary complication of the “definition of Jewishness” should be 
avoided.119 
By the second week of January 1941, the question of who was 
a Jew and what to do about it was now firmly part of the bu-
reaucratic reality in Brussels.120  While section four of the first 
Jewish order permitted any person, upon a simple request, to 
consult the Register of Jews, the various municipalities in 
Brussels soon found themselves with not just a line of visitors 
wishing to see the Register, but with a multitude of individuals 
seeking the Belgian equivalent of a French “certificate of non-
registration” (certificat de non-appartenance).  Arguably, any 
measures by municipal employees to determine someone’s 
status would be active implementation of the orders and would 
constitute illegal participation.121  The lack of definition became 
  
 119. Jahresbericht-Mai 1940/1941, des Militärbefehlshabers, in Belgien und 
Nordfrankreich, Judenverordnungen und deren Ausführung, CEGES (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“Die vorstehenden 
Bestimmungen wurden in der Judenverordnung des Militärbefehlshabers in 
Belgien und Nordfrankreich weggelassen, weil sie für die Durchführung der 
für Belgien im Frage kommenden Judenmassnahmen nicht aktuell sind und 
weil im Interesse der Erleichterung des Vollsuge durch die belgischen 
Behörden jede überflüssige Komplizierung des Judenbegriffe vermieden 
werden sollte.”).   
 120. See, e.g., Letter from OFK 672 (Sept. 22, 1941) (on file with the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law) (Issues arose as to how to remove, according 
to legal norms, a stamp JUIF-JOOD, placed in error on the documents of an 
individual whose father had been “mistakenly” entered in the Jewish Regis-
ter.); Letter from the Aliens Office to OFK (Feb. 1942), Police, AVB, Guerre 
40–45, File 791.94 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) 
(regarding K. and the exact legal definition of Jew).  See also Rozenblum, su-
pra note 2, at 28 (discussing the removal of individuals from the Register of 
Jews in Liège). 
 121. See Letter from Permanent Council of Legislation, Nov. 21, 1940, supra 
note 76.  Indeed, the Brussels’ Population Bureau specifically decided that if it 
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increasingly problematic as employers began requesting certifi-
cates of non-registration before making hiring decisions.122   
The first reaction to this problem was ad hoc.  In early Janu-
ary 1941, the newly appointed medical inspector for the schools 
of Brussels requested a certificate of non-registration in order to 
take up his new post and conform to the anti-Jewish decrees.  
The Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages responded that no 
such certifications existed but, nevertheless, informed the 
school department that the doctor had not requested entry on 
the Register of Jews.123  Here, again, is an example of city offi-
  
was to maintain the fiction of “passive collaboration” it could not respond to 
inquiries about who was required to register as a Jew.  See id. 
 122. Letter to the Secretary-General of the Interior (Jan. 10, 1941), 
USHMM, RG.65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law).  The Directors explained:  
But since the coming into effect of the order individuals and espe-
cially notaries, lawyers and bailiffs have requested certificates of reg-
istration or non-registration in the Register of Jews.  At the same 
time, certain public bodies demand that every request for employ-
ment be accompanied by a certificate of non-registration in the Regis-
ter of Jews.  This demand is apparently based on the interpretation of 
the 2nd order furnished in your circular of 6 December 1940 which 
states on page 4, “whenever new nominations occur, proof must be 
given by way of an official document that the candidate is not a Jew 
under the order.” 
Id.  
(Mais depuis la mise en vigueur de l’ordonnance . . . des particuliers 
et surtout des notaires, des avocats et des huissiers sollicitent des at-
testations d’inscription ou de non-inscription au registre des Juifs.  
Par ailleurs, certaines administrations publiques exigent que toute 
demande d’admission à un emploi soit accompagnée d’un certificat de 
non-inscription au registre des Juifs.  Cette exigence est apparem-
ment fondée sur l’interprétation de la 2e ordonnance, fournie par vo-
tre circulaire du 6 décembre 1940 où il est dit à la page 4: “lors des 
nouvelles nominations, la preuve doit être apportée par document au-
thentique que le candidat n’est pas Juif au sens de l’ordonnance.”).  
 123. Letter from the Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages to R. Catteau 
(Jan. 16, 1941), USHMM, RG 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law).  The next day, a similar letter was sent from 
the same office to M. De Tollenaere of the City Secretariat, informing him that 
Jean Robert Leemans, who was seeking employment in the Parks and Gar-
dens Department of the city, had not demanded his inscription in the Register 
of Jews.  Letter from the Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages to M. De Tol-
lenaere (Jan. 17, 1941), USHMM, RG 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law).     
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cials taking the initiative to implement anti-Jewish orders.  In 
this case they do so even while waiting for instructions from 
their legal superiors.  At best, this is bureaucratic routine, the 
administrative classification of inhabitants of Brussels as 
“Jews” and “non-Jews.”  At worst, this is an instance of steps 
taken to protect the new category of Belgians, the concomitant 
counterpart of the “Jew,” the legally recognized “non-Jew.”124 
The use of ad hoc confirmation for each new employee could 
not continue, however, if the rule of law and orderly bureau-
cratic routine were to be followed.  City officials asked that a 
mechanism for dealing with such requests be established.  The 
Conference of Mayors and the Permanent Council decided that 
in order to undertake the recruitment of personnel in a reason-
able and orderly fashion, they would specifically “[a]uthorize 
the Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages to deliver declara-
tions attesting that interested parties had not requested their 
entry into the Register of Jews.”125 
This authorization goes beyond mere passive application of 
anti-Jewish measures.  Brussels, through its highest govern-
mental office, created the very means for compliance when the 
law was itself silent.  Declarations confirming that Belgian citi-
zens seeking employment in public agencies of the Belgian state 
were not Jews became part of the legal, documentary discourse 
of the City of Brussels.126   
  
 124. See generally David Fraser, Law Before Auschwitz: Aryan and Jew in 
the Nazi Rechtsstaat, in THINKING THROUGH THE BODY OF THE LAW 63 (Pheng 
Cheah et al. eds., 1996). 
 125. Extrait du Registre aux Délibérations du Collège des Bourgmestres et 
Echevins (Jan. 24, 1941), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 bis (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (“Autoriser la Direction de 
l’Etat civil à délivrer des déclarations attestant que les intéressés n’ont pas 
requis leur inscription au registre des JUIFS.”). 
 126. See id.  The declarations stated that the individuals in question “had 
not requested their entry into the Register of Jews;” they did not state that 
the individuals were non-Jews, nor did they use the phrase created by French 
bureaucrats and law and state that the individuals “did not belong to the Jew-
ish race.”  See id.  Thus, city officials did not directly classify anyone as a Jew 
or non-Jew; they simply reported a bureaucratically recorded fact.  See id.  
The province of Brabant appears to have adopted a somewhat more complex 
procedure.  Brabant province offered anyone seeking to establish non-Jewish 
status a written deposition stating that section one of the first anti-Jewish 
order (the definitional provisions) did not apply to them.  This type of proce-
dure seems to more clearly implicate the administration in a decision-making 
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On December 6, 1940, the Ministry of Labor wrote to city offi-
cials informing them of their obligation to gather information 
concerning Jewish employees, including their names, places 
and dates of birth, and the nationality of their parents and 
grandparents.127  The Belgian government did not ask whether 
an employee was “registered” as a Jew, but rather, asked him to 
identify himself and his ancestors according to criteria estab-
lished under the Nazi legal order.  The line between passive 
collaboration and participation became very fine indeed.  
In February and March of 1941, at the request of the GMA, 
the governmental hierarchy swung into action to determine the 
success of the effort to remove Jews from Belgian civil service.128  
The Brussels Archive contains an extensive set of documents 
recording the number of municipal employees who were re-
moved from their jobs because they were identified as Jews.  
For example, thirteen employees of the Municipal Welfare 
Agency were removed, and in the Office of Births, Deaths and 
Marriages, the agency charged with ensuring the successful 
completion of the registration process, Mr. Joostens was able to 
report a “nil return.”129  In total, twenty-two employees of the 
City of Brussels were dismissed because they were identified as 
Jews.130  Although this is a record of compliance and not resis-
  
or classificatory process.  See Archives Houtart, CEGES, MIC 79, sample 
document (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 127. Letter from R. Vandevelde, Directeur des Affaires Administratives 
(Dec. 6, 1940), Secrétariat, Juifs, Personnel Enseignant, AVB (with attach-
ments) (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  
 128. Note from Putyzens (Feb. 28, 1941), Secrétariat, Juifs, AVB (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  
 129. Memorandum to the City Secretary’s office (Mar. 4, 1941), Secrétariat, 
Juifs, AVB (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  In addi-
tion, the litigation department informed the City Secretary that Miss B., a 
lawyer, stopped work on Dec. 31, 1941.  Note Instructing Chiefs to Count the 
Number of Jews (Mar. 3, 1941), Secrétariat, Juifs, AVB (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  A journalist, Mr. C., who had been 
hired as a temporary employee by the Municipal Food Service left the same 
day.  One worker in the Police Department was let go, and five employees in 
the Public Education Department lost their jobs because they were Jews.  See 
Urgent Letter from the Police Chief (Mar. 4, 1941), Secrétariat, Juifs, AVB (on 
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).   
 130. Letter from Van Durme to the Governor of Brabant (Mar. 18, 1941), 
Secrétariat, AVB, Guerre 40–45 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law).  See Liste des agents temporaires employes a la confection du 
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tance, it is prudent to note that the record regarding dismissals 
is incomplete.131  At this stage, however, there is little evidence 
at all that the City did anything other than comply fully with 
the letter and spirit of the German order.132  
VI. COMMUNICATING, INFORMING, AND DECIDING: PASSIVE 
COLLABORATION 1941–1944 
After the orders of 1940, the Germans continued to seek full 
compliance with their anti-Jewish orders and the municipality 
continued to comply with German instructions.  In May 1941, 
for example, the Mayor transmitted a list of all German Jewish 
men, including their names and addresses.133 
In June 1941, as new anti-Jewish measures began to have a 
direct economic impact on Jewish families, municipalities were 
faced with the issue of Jews moving into their area.134 The issue 
was exacerbated by the exile of Jews from Antwerp; the Ger-
mans forced them to move to the Province of Limburg.135  Sev-
eral Antwerp Jews obtained permission from the Military 
Commander in Hasselt to move again, this time to Brussels, but 
only on the condition that they provide written authorization 
from the Mayor of the Brussels to local officials in the area to 
which they wished to relocate.  The order imposing the obliga-
  
registre des Juifs (Dec. 28, 1943), Secrétariat, Juifs, AVB (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 131. See Delplancq, Des paroles et des actes, supra note 2, at 174. 
 132. Ordre de Service No. 1979, Dec. 12, 1940, supra note 97; Letter from A. 
Buez, Ministry of Education, to the Head of Public Education, Brussels (Jan. 
9, 1941), Secrétariat, AVB, Guerre 40–45, Personnel Enseignant (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law); Letter from Tits, Director of Pub-
lic Education, to City Secretary (Jan. 11, 1941), Secrétariat, AVB, Guerre 40–
45 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  Tits’ letter does 
contain a typewritten annotation by Catteau indicating that there may be 
certain reasons to temper both the harshness of the order and a strict applica-
tion of Belgian law.  Technically, the employees were not fired because they 
were Jews; instead, they were made redundant.  Id. 
 133. Letter from Hauptmann Döring, Ortskommandantur to the Mayor and 
handwritten annotation (May 13, 1941), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 
884 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 134. Neufassung: Verordnung über wirtschaftliche Massnahmen gegen 
Juden (Dritte Judenverordnung) [Decree of 31 May 1940 concerning economic 
measures against the Jews (Third Jewish Order)] (May 31, 1940), reprinted in 
VERORDNUNGSBLATT (June 10, 1941). 
 135. See STEINBERG, UN PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES JUIFS, supra note 3, at 52–54. 
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tion to create the Register of Jews and to transfer the appropri-
ate records to the new locality of registered Jews, who subse-
quently moved, did not, however, include any mention of such 
an authorization.  Once again, the silence of the law and the 
practical exigencies of the system of Occupation posed a legal 
and practical dilemma for local authorities.136 
At the same time, city officials continued to receive specific 
instructions from their Belgian superiors and the Germans.  
For example, all identity cards of registered Jews now had to 
carry the bilingual stamp, in red ink, “JUIF-JOOD.”137  The list 
of registered Jews, including those who had neglected to have 
their cards stamped, was to be forwarded directly to the Ger-
man Security Police (Sicherheitspolizei).138  City officials began, 
at some level, to distance themselves from the process of mark-
ing Jews by insisting that no posters announcing the stamping 
requirement be issued or displayed.  Instead, they relied on 
Secretary-General Romsée’s circular, in which he stated that 
the new process would be announced by notice in the press.  
The circular did not state that the city could not proceed by way 
of public notices themselves but, in this instance, no innovation 
or self-motivated actions were forthcoming; city officials would 
simply prepare themselves for any Jew who chose to comply.139   
The Office of Births, Deaths and Marriages, however, in order 
to proceed with stamping identity cards and constructing a list 
with special markings indicating which registered Jews had 
chosen to have their cards stamped, borrowed five employees 
from the Public Procurement Agency and maintained tempo-
rary employees from their own service to assist in the task.140  
  
 136. Letter from the Director of the Population Office to Putzeys, Secretary 
of Brussels (June 27, 1941), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 bis (on 
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 137. Letter from Romsée, Secretary-General, to Commissioners, Mayors, 
and Governors (July 29, 1941), USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 138. Id.  
 139. Letter from Joostens to Verhaeghe de Naeyer (Aug. 5, 1941), USHMM, 
RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law). 
 140. Letter from Joostens to the College (Aug. 12, 1941), USHMM, RG. 
65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law); 
Letter from the College to Dienstelle des Sicherheitspolizei (Aug. 29, 1941), 
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Contact with the German Security Police continued in the fall of 
1941.  Romsée informed the Mayors that, in the future, infor-
mation compiled under the Jewish orders relating to the change 
of address of registered Jews was to be sent to the headquarters 
of the Secret Police.141 At the same time, this information took 
on ever more sinister overtones as the Germans decreed that 
Jews were henceforth forbidden from moving anywhere other 
than the four cities of Antwerp, Brussels, Charleroi and Liège.142  
During the same period, the various municipalities of greater 
Brussels were compiling their own lists of municipal govern-
ment employees who were identified, or had “identified them-
selves,” as Jews.  Mayor Coelst forwarded that information to 
the German authorities on October 24, 1941.143  Later, in the 
autumn of 1941, German authorities in Belgium introduced an 
order stripping Jews outside of Germany of their German citi-
zenship.144  The Brussels Administration had already handed 
over, at the request of the German Ortskommandantur, a list of 
German Jewish men figuring in the Register of Jews.145  The 
new Reich provision quite naturally led the local German au-
thorities to seek all information from the Belgian administra-
tion concerning “former” German Jews.  While waiting for other 
  
USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Inter-
national Law).   
 141. Letter from Romsée, Secretary-General, to Commissioners, Mayors, 
and Governors (Sept. 23, 1941), USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 142. Verordnung über Aufenthaltsbeschränkungen für Juden [Order of 29 
August 1941 limiting the free circulation of Jews] (Aug. 29, 1941), reprinted in 
VERORDNUNGSBLATT (Sept. 5, 1941). 
 143. Letter from Oesterhelt, Oberfeldkommandantur, to Coelst (Oct. 15, 
1941), and reply from Coelst (Oct. 24, 1941), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, 
File 845 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (Correspon-
dance avec l’autorité allemande). 
 144. 11th Order Concerning the Imperial German Nationality Law (Nov. 25, 
1941) (local application of Germany’s 11th regulation depriving Jews of their 
citizenship).  For a discussion of this measure’s role in the German anti-
Jewish legal order in Belgium and in other jurisdictions, see generally David 
Fraser, This is Not Like any Other Legal Question: A Brief History of Nazi 
Law Before U.K. and U.S. Courts, 19 CONN. J.  INT’L L. 59 (2003). 
 145. Letter from Döring to the Mayor (May 13, 1941), Cabinet du Bourg-
mestre, AVB, File 884 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law).  The list of names and addresses was due May 15, 1941; it was deliv-
ered May 16, 1941 at 11:00 a.m.  There seems to be little evidence of obfusca-
tion or delay here.  See id. 
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departments to decide how they would deal with their obliga-
tions under the order, the Office of Births, Deaths and Mar-
riages decided to take a position on how to deal with requests to 
marry and for travel documents by newly stateless Jews.146   
As they bemoaned the absence of an official attestation by the 
German authorities on how to deal with the loss of citizenship 
by “former” German Jews, the officials of the Passport Office 
and the Registry of Births, Deaths and Marriages were quick to 
underline the distinction between measures that involved them 
as Belgian bureaucrats doing their legal jobs and activities un-
dertaken by the Germans for German purposes.  Thus, Belgian 
bureaucrats were perfectly willing to use the Register of Jews 
for their own domestic purposes, but would not be bound by the 
prescriptions of the 11th Order, which was viewed as a purely 
  
 146. Perte de la Nationalité Allemande par les Juifs Séjournant à l’Etranger 
(Nov. 25, 1941), USHMM, RG. 65.003 P, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law).  The Brussels officials revealed: 
In order to cover ourselves, we have demanded that the parties of 
German origin concerned produce: 
1. an extract from the Register of Jews 
2. an extract from the Population Register(s) as required. 
Without a doubt, the real guarantee would be found in the production 
of a document originating with the German Authority itself stating 
that the person in question has lost German nationality through the 
application of the November decree. 
It does not appear that for the present at least it is possible to obtain 
such a declaration. 
Id.  
(Pour nous couvrir, nous avons exigé la production par les intéressés 
d’origine allemande: 
1. d’un extrait du registre des juifs 
2. d’un extrait du ou des registres de population, selon le cas. 
Sans doute la véritable garantie serait trouvée dans la production 
d’une pièce émanant de l’autorité allemande elle-même et constatant 
que l’intéressé a perdu la nationalité allemande par l’application de 
l’ordonnance de novembre. 
Il ne semble pas qu’actuellement tout au moins il soit possible 
d’obtenir pareille attestation.). 
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German measure.147  This distinction, between the powers of the 
Occupiers under their own domestic laws and the jurisdiction 
and practices of local officials under Belgian law, was consistent 
with the idea of a Belgian state apparatus distinct from the 
German Occupiers.  Yet, at the same time, it must be noted that 
the Brussels officials established their own ad hoc system of 
recordkeeping and official documentation concerning stateless 
former German Jews and their marriage and travel documents.  
Although the 11th Order did not mandate specific action by 
the Belgian government, the Germans insisted that the Confer-
ence of Mayors ensure proper notation on population registers, 
the Register of Jews itself, identity cards and other documents 
serving as valid identification; they also insisted on the with-
drawal of all other documents such as nationalization papers, 
passports, and identity cards dealing with German national-
ity.148 
The effect of the 11th Order in Belgium continued to trouble 
local officials.  They insisted that they lacked jurisdiction over 
substantive definitional issues under the Regulation, and that 
the sole German power was to issue documents required by in-
dividuals.  The Secretary-General of the Interior, for example, 
inquired as to whether the Alien Police would enter a Mr. 
  
 147. Id.  For Brussels officials, their power to act was not determined by the 
actions of the Security Police.   
[I]t is when it is a question of executory measures to be taken by the 
Reich that it is established that the dossier of the party in question 
must contain as a basic document a declaration from the Security 
Services.  This text can not bind us when it is a matter of delivering a 
passport, or of marriage….  
Id.   
([C]’est à l’occasion de mesures d’exécution à prendre par le Reich  
qu’il est prévu que le dossier de l’intéressé doit contenir comme pièce 
de base une attestation des Services de la Sûreté.  Ce texte ne peut 
nous lier pour la question de délivrance de passeport, de mariage....).  
 148. Letter from Richter to Mayor Coelst as Chair of the Conference of May-
ors (Aug. 18, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 844 (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  The demand for compliance derived 
from the office charged with the “administration” of property, more precisely 
defined as the Aryanization office.  The principal effect of the 11th Order was 
to expropriate the property of expatriate German Jews.  Here, Brussels pro-
vides Aryanization officials all of the information necessary to identify those 
individuals whose property could be taken from them.  See id. 
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Wilhelm Loeb in their records as a stateless person pursuant to 
his loss of German citizenship.149  The Police representative, Mr. 
Standaert, replied that the question was beyond the jurisdiction 
of the Belgian authorities and that Mr. Loeb should address 
himself to the appropriate German authorities.150  However, the 
Police also stated that once Loeb was in possession of an appro-
priate document identifying him as someone who had lost his 
citizenship, he could be entered into the Belgian files as a state-
less person.151  
VII. THE YELLOW STAR ORDER AND THE LEGALIZED EXCLUSION 
OF THE JEWS  
On May 27, 1942, the German Military Command for Bel-
gium and Northern France introduced the so-called Yellow Star 
Order.152  All Jews over the age of six were forbidden to appear 
in public without wearing the “Jewish Star.”153  The second or-
der relating to the Star was passed the same day and stated, in 
section four, that Jews bound by the obligation to wear the Star 
  
 149. Letter from Monsieur Standaert, Alien Police, to the Secretary-General 
of the Interior (Mar. 3, 1942), USHMM, Reel 430 (on file with the Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Letter from Standaert to Secre-
tary-General, Mar. 3, 1942].  On Oct. 7, 1942, the Population Bureau for the 
suburb of Ixelles compiled a supplementary list of German Jews and included 
Benjamine Billa, who had registered himself as a stateless person.  Liste 
Complementairè de Juives allemandes (Oct. 7, 1942), USHMM, RG. 68.001 M, 
Reel 50 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  Belgian 
officials not only complied with the letter of German law, but with its spirit.  
For example, Billa was not even a German Jew under German law; Ixelles 
municipal officials, however, classified him as a German Jew, in part because 
that is what the Germans themselves wanted.  See id.  
 150. Letter from Standaert to Secretary-General, Mar. 3, 1942, supra note 
149. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Verordnung über die Kennzeichnung der Juden [order of 27 May 1942 
establishing a distinctive marking for Jews] (May 27, 1942), reprinted in 
VERORDNUNGSBLATT (June 1, 1942) [hereinafter Verordnung über die 
Kennzeichnung der Juden]. 
 153. See STEINBERG, UN PAYS OCCUPÉ ET SES JUIFS, supra note 3, at 84.  The 
star was six-pointed, made of yellow cloth with black markings, palm–size, 
and contained the letter “J.”  Verordnung über die Kennzeichnung der Juden, 
supra note 152, § 1(1).  It had to be conspicuous and sewed permanently on 
the left side of the breast.  Id. § 1(2).    
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had to obtain them from the same municipal authorities where 
they were registered.154 
The Mayor of Brussels, after meeting with his colleagues 
from the various towns and municipalities of the region, wrote 
to the Germans on behalf of the Conference of Mayors on June 
4, 1942.155  This letter was a radical departure for the City of 
Brussels from its previous stance of implementing anti-Jewish 
decrees.  Mayor Coelst wrote in part: 
It is not incumbent upon us to discuss with you the expediency 
of this measure taken against the Hebrews, but we do have 
the duty to inform you that you can not demand our collabora-
tion in its enforcement. 
A large number of Jews are Belgians, and we cannot resolve to 
associate ourselves with a prohibition which damages the dig-
nity of every man, whoever he may be. 
This prejudice is all the more grave as it carries with it, for 
those who are subjected thereto, a prohibition against wearing 
the insignia of our national honors systems. 
We are convinced that you will recognize the legitimate nature 
of our feelings…156 
  
 154. Verordnung zur Durchführung der Verordnung über die Kennzeich-
nung der Juden [Order of 27 May 1942 taken for the application of the order 
establishing a distinctive marking for Jews] (May 27, 1942), reprinted in 
VERORDNUNGSBLATT (June 1, 1942). 
 155. Letter to Dr. Gentzke (June 4, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, 
File 846 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 156. Id.  
(Il ne nous appartient pas de discuter avec vous de l’opportunité de la 
mesure prise contre les Israélites, mais nous avons le devoir de vous 
faire connaître que vous ne pouvez exiger de nous une collaboration à 
son exécution.  
Un grand nombre de Juifs sont Belges, et nous ne pouvons nous ré-
soudre à nous associer à une prescription qui porte une atteinte aussi 
directe à la dignité de tout homme, quel qu’il soit.  
Cette atteinte est d’autant plus grave qu’elle implique pour ceux 
qu’elle frappe l’interdiction de porter les insignes de nos ordres natio-
naux. 
Nous sommes convaincus que vous reconnaîtrez la légitimité de nos 
sentiments....). 
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The letter from the Conference is a key document in the his-
tory and myth of Brussels and its Jews under the Occupation.  
On the surface, it is a refusal grounded in ideas of basic human 
dignity (“a prohibition which damages the dignity of every 
man”).157  It is an act of resistance wherein the City of Brussels 
categorically refused to implement, or play any role in imple-
menting, this particular anti-Jewish order.158  Indeed, after 
meeting with a delegation of the Conference on the following 
day, the German authorities yielded to the Belgian refusal and 
undertook the distribution of the Stars themselves.  The Ger-
mans asked only that a notice be posted in the place where the 
Register of Jews was held, informing Jews of the time and place 
distribution of the Stars.159   
However, an undated document from the Mayor’s Office, enti-
tled “Number of Stars of David,” lists the number of Stars by 
locality, from 6,500 for Brussels down to twelve for Gan-
shoren.160  It would seem that Belgium made preparations for 
compliance even when making its principled protest.  Interest-
ingly, this letter uses the French term, Israélites, which I ren-
der imperfectly as “Hebrews,” instead of the term Juifs, al-
though they did return to the latter in the next sentence.  This 
is not, I believe, a slip of the pen or typewriter, but rather an 
attempt to distinguish the Nazi policy of identifying Jews from 
the Belgian concept of not identifying Hebrews.  The term Israé-
lites carries with it Belgian understandings of equality and dig-
nity inherent in the Constitution.  At some level, the Mayors 
  
 157. Id. 
 158. See id.  See also Letter from Van Glabbeke, head of the Mayor’s Office, 
to Joseph Bologne of Liège, Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law) (communicating refusal to 
collaborate in enforcement of the anti-Jewish decrees).  After keeping a close 
eye on the developments in Brussels, the Mayor of Liège also refused to im-
plement the order.  See Rozenblum, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
 159. Letter from Dr. Gentzke to the Mayor of Brussels (June 8, 1942), Cabi-
net du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of In-
ternational Law) [hereinafter Letter from Gentzke, June 8, 1942].  
 160. Ordonnance 27.5.42 établissant une marque distinctive pour les Juifs 
(May 27, 1942), AVB, Police, Guerre 40–45, File 791.94 (on file with the Broo-
klyn Journal of International Law). 
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considered the distinction between Belgian and foreign Jews to 
be of some importance.161 
It is also certain that the process of implementing the Yellow 
Star Order was not entirely outside the practice of municipal 
officials in Brussels.  The German request, to place notices in 
the offices where the Register of Jews was kept, passed through 
the various municipalities with some haste.  The contents of the 
letter from Dr. Gentzke to Mayor Coelst, received at five fifteen 
in the afternoon on June 8, 1942, were communicated the next 
morning by telephone to all municipalities represented at the 
Conference.162  Given that the distribution was to begin on June 
9 and that the letter itself was marked urgent and hand-
delivered to Mayor Coelst’s office, a certain degree of compli-
ance is apparent in the shared haste of the series of telephone 
calls from the Mayor’s office.163  Furthermore, the police of Brus-
sels assured the Germans of their presence at the offices of the 
Association of Jews in Belgium (AJB) every day the Stars were 
to be distributed.164 
Finally, correspondence in the Mayor’s files demonstrates 
that Jewish citizens attempted to get exemptions from the obli-
gation of wearing the Star.  Section one of the second order on 
the implementation of the Yellow Star permitted requests for 
exemption for those who were Jewish husbands living in mixed 
marriages in which there were non-Jewish children, and for 
Jewish wives in childless mixed marriages.165  In at least one 
case, Mayor Coelst intervened in favour of an eighty-year-old 
woman whose late husband had connections with the Belgian 
Royal family and who had been a local Mayor.  She had refused 
  
 161. Fraser, Fragility of Law, supra note 5, at 273 (“The history of the Holo-
caust in Belgium ... is informed by the operative and operating distinction 
between ‘Belgian’ Jews and foreign Jews.  Of the 55,671 Jews registered in 
Belgium under the anti-Jewish decrees, 3,680 were Belgian citizens.”).  
 162. Letter from Gentzke, June 8, 1942, supra note 159 (handwritten anno-
tation). 
 163. See id.  
 164. Report from Girthy (June 12, 1942), AVB, Police, Guerre 40–45, File 
791.94 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 165. See, e.g., Letter from Coelst to Dr. Callies, Stadtkommissär for Brus-
sels (June 19, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 845 (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law).   
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to leave her house out of fear and embarrassment if she had to 
wear the Star.166  
As the German Occupiers expanded the exclusion of Jews 
from Belgian society, they continued to call upon Brussels offi-
cials to assist in the implementation of the steps leading to-
wards the Final Solution.  The December 1, 1941, the Jewish 
Education Decree set up a system of distinct Jewish schools, 
thus excluding Jewish students from the public education sys-
tem.167  Under section three of the decree, the Ministry of Public 
Education was given overall jurisdiction, while local education 
officials in the towns and cities of Belgium were called upon to 
implement the exclusion of Jewish students. 
In Brussels, the Mayor had already been asked to supervise 
the census of all Jewish students in public secondary schools 
and to contact private educational institutions to obtain the 
relevant information from them.168  Three weeks later, all but 
one of the towns in the City of Brussels had completed the cen-
sus of Jewish students and had sent reports to the German au-
thorities.169  At this stage, the municipal authorities continued 
to operate with the bureaucratic efficiency with which they had 
completed the other tasks of compiling and distributing infor-
mation about Jewish residents.  There was no delay, there was 
  
 166. Id.  The Widow W. was born in the United States and belonged to a 
very honourable family.  Her husband had connections to the Belgian Royal 
Family and elected officials.  At some level, therefore, we might read this let-
ter as an intervention on behalf of a “good Jew,” an Israélite, not a Juif.  This 
interpretation would make the Mayor’s intervention on her behalf consistent 
with the views he adopted in his “letter of protest” only a few days earlier.  
Once more, narrow and restrictive understandings of citizenship and “Bel-
gianness” may be at play here.  Id.  In a similar case, the Mayor of Brussels, 
Mr. Grauls, intervened on behalf of a Mr. B. because B. was a man of upstand-
ing reputation and was well-known in the right circles, particularly those 
related to Belgium’s colony in the Congo.  See Letter from Grauls and related 
correspondence (Nov. 9, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 946 (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).      
 167. Verordnung über das jüdische Schulwesen [Decree of 1 December 1941] 
(Dec. 1, 1941), §§ 1, 2, reprinted in VERORDNUNGSBLATT (Dec. 2, 1941). 
 168. Ecoliers juifs dans les Ecoles moyennes (Feb. 4, 1941) (on file with the 
Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 169. Ecoliers juifs dans les Ecoles moyennes (Feb. 22, 1941), Cabinet du 
Bourgmestre, AVB, File 884 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law). 
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no refusal, there were no protests—there was “participation” 
without collaboration. 
In April 1942, about the same time as the Yellow Star Order 
was raising serious doubts about Belgian complicity, the AJB 
had difficulty obtaining buildings and other facilities for the 
establishment of Jewish primary schools.170  German officials 
demanded assistance from Brussels in finding space.  Mayor 
Coelst replied, in the name of the Conference of Mayors, that 
local administrations were unable to comply with the demands 
for space for primary schools.  He wrote:  
We must tell you that the assistance which until now has been 
given to the Hebrews by local governments for the creation of 
kindergartens has resulted in numerous expressions of satis-
faction. 
A large number of the children who attend these schools are 
Belgians, and many among them are unhappy.  On this 
ground, they deserve our concern.  Please rest assured that we 
have done, and will continue to do, everything possible to alle-
viate the harshness of the measures taken against them. 
But it is important that you also know that what we have done 
for the kindergartens we cannot do for the other types of 
schools.171 
  
 170. Letter from Löffler (Apr. 21, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 
845 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  See generally 
LES CURATEURS DU GHETTO: L’ASSOCIATION DES JUIFS EN BELGIQUE SOUS 
L’OCCUPATION NAZIE (Jean-Philippe Schreiber & Rudi Van Doorslaer eds., 
2004).  The order on Jewish education granted sole jurisdiction over Jewish 
education to the AJB.  Created by another order a week earlier, the AJB was 
the Jewish umbrella organization established as a “Judenrat” in Belgium.  
Verordnung über die Errichtung einer Vereinigung der Juden in Belgien 
[Decree of 25 November 1941 creating an Association of Jews in Belgium] 
(Nov. 25, 1941), reprinted in VERORDNUNGSBLATT (Dec. 2, 1941).  The role of 
the AJB is a complex and fascinating one, but beyond the scope of this article. 
 171. Letter to Dr. Callies from Coelst (May 30, 1942) (on file with the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law) [hereinafter Letter to Dr. Callies from 
Coelst, May 30, 1942] 
(Nous tenons à vous dire que l’aide apportée jusqu’à ce jour par les 
administrations communales aux Israélites pour la création d’écoles 
gardiennes nous a valu de leur part de nombreux témoignages de sa-
tisfaction. 
Un grand nombre d’enfants qui fréquentent ces écoles sont belges, 
beaucoup d’entre eux sont malheureux. A ce titre ils méritent notre 
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Mayor Coelst invokes the term Israélites because many of the 
children are Belgians and “[o]n this ground they deserve our 
concern.”172  In the context of administrative compliance, it ap-
pears that something had changed.  It may be that city officials 
were shocked because they saw, as they may not have seen 
through the simple act of registration, the real human suffering 
imposed by Nazi antisemitic laws.  It may also be that the suf-
fering of Belgians (Israélites) shocked them.173  
Finally, we come to the concluding remarks in Mayor Coelst’s 
letter which again render the stance taken by the Conference 
morally and legally ambiguous.  The last paragraph indicates 
that what had been done for one type of educational establish-
ment could not be done for primary schools.174  The French con-
struction here is pertinent.  The Mayor wrote that they would 
not be able to do what they had done previously.175  The French 
verbs Coelst used, however, create the impression of a refusal, 
subject to some qualification.  Coelst says nous ne pourrons le 
réaliser which translates into “we will not be able to accomplish 
what we have done for the other schools.”176  This reads less as a 
protest grounded in principle than as a complaint that the re-
sources are not available to give practical effect to the desired 
outcome.177 
  
sollicitude. Soyez convaincu que nous fait et que nous continuerons à 
faire tout ce qui est possible pour atténuer la rigueur des mesures 
prises contre eux. 
Mais il importe que vous sachiez que ce que nous avons fait en faveur 
des écoles gardiennes nous ne pourrons pas le réaliser pour les autres 
établissements scolaires envisagés.).  
 172. Id. 
 173. Other factors are important here.  We know that city administrations 
did not hesitate to assist in establishing separate Jewish schools.  Therefore, 
this protest, if that is what it is, did not result from an ethical awareness that 
the separation of Jewish children was wrong, but from the realization that the 
practice of separation carries with it certain cruel consequences.  This is the 
distinction between the hermeneutics of rejection and acceptance.  See gener-
ally Weisberg, supra note 23. 
 174. Letter to Dr. Callies from Coelst, May 30, 1942, supra note 171. 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. (“[N]ous ne pourrons pas le réaliser pour les autres établissements 
scolaires envisagés.”). 
 177. Neither by definition, nor by the exclusion of all other possibilities, is 
this the real, or only, reason for non-compliance.  The post-war construction of 
local resistance placed a strong emphasis on the use of obfuscation and ex-
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How are we to understand resistance in the Belgian context 
and in the context of Belgian municipal administrators?  
Against whom and against what were they protesting?  The 
Belgian administration was willing to set aside some facilities 
for the exclusive use of the AJB but would not, or could not, 
provide more.  They had already provided lists of Jewish pupils 
in February 1941, but when asked to provide the same informa-
tion to the Department of Public Education, Mayor Coelst of-
fered the Conference’s regrets that they could not provide such 
information.178  Here, the city and its officials seem to be taking 
a firm stance, whatever the grounds, in refusing to hand over 
any more facilities for the creation of Jewish schools pursuant 
to the German decrees. 
In response to Belgian protest, the GMA finessed the situa-
tion.  The Germans acknowledged the letters from Mayor Coelst 
and declared that the legal obligations for Jewish education 
were henceforth matters between the City and the AJB, upon 
whom the decree placed the burden to establish separate Jew-
ish schools.179   The problem was now uniquely Belgian, which 
compelled the Belgian Jewish organization to comply with the 
German order.  In such a situation, the Conference of Mayors 
was informed that the municipalities had decided to assist the 
Jews to the greatest extent possible.180 
Around the same time, that the city responded to demands 
for separate Jewish schools, the Mayors refused to allow local 
police to help in arrests for compulsory labour.  In addition, the 
Conference issued a formal protest concerning deportations for 
“military labour” outside Belgium.  Here, the Conference of 
Mayors intervened in an unambiguous fashion.  After express-
ing their profound emotion at hearing stories of compulsory de-
  
cuses concerning lack of resources as defining elements of the refusals to im-
plement anti-Jewish laws.  Thus, the use of the verbs pouvoir and réaliser in 
this context may simply be a way of obscuring the real reasons for non-
compliance.   
 178. Letter to Principal Inspector Janssen (June 26, 1942), Cabinet du 
Bourgmestre, AVB, File 866 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of Interna-
tional Law). 
 179. Letter from Coelst to the Conference (July 6, 1942), Cabinet du Bourg-
mestre, AVB, File 845 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International 
Law). 
 180. Conference of Mayors (July 9, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, 
File 866 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
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portations, the Conference requested that the Secretaries-
General intervene with the Germans in order to bring a halt to 
the deportations.  They invoked, for the first time in any official 
correspondence, the limitations imposed on the Germans by the 
provisions of the Hague Convention.181  
VIII. BUREAUCRATIC ROUTINE, ADMINISTRATION, AND JEWISH 
PROPERTY IN BRUSSELS 
While the city was charged with ensuring compliance with 
the signage regulations for restaurants, cafes and bars (section 
fourteen of the Jewish Order), the vast majority of actions and 
legal measures involving Jewish businesses, their registration, 
and administration were left in the hands of the Germans.182  
This did not mean, however, that the city administration was 
completely insulated from dealing with aspects of the Aryaniza-
tion process.  For example, municipal officials had to deal with 
the provision of utility services such as gas, electricity and wa-
ter for Jewish businesses. 
In August 1943, for example, the accounts department of the 
City Gas and Electricity Board wrote to the German adminis-
trator, Karl Schneider, concerning premises owned by Mr. C., a 
Jew.  The German administrator had sought the deposit paid by 
C. to the Gas and Electricity Board as an “Aryanized” Jewish 
asset.  City officials insisted that because the account had been 
opened by Mr. C., and he had not cancelled his subscription, 
they could not release the funds.  This is, in the mythology of 
Belgian resistance, administrative recalcitrance under the guise 
of strict obedience to legal obligations.  The letter went on to 
ask, however, for permission to seal the meters, and assumed 
that once this technical procedure was completed, the Board 
would be free to disburse the funds in question to the Nazi bank 
account.183 
  
 181. Letter to Secretary-General Nyns (July 3, 1942), and reply from Nyns 
(July 9, 1942), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 947 (on file with the Brook-
lyn Journal of International Law). 
 182. See generally COMMISSION D’ETUDE SUR LE SORT DES BIENS DES MEMBRES 
DE LA COMMUNAUTE JUIVE DE BELGIQUE SPOLIES OU DELAISSES PENDANT LA 
GUERRE 1940–1945, FINAL REPORT (2001).  
 183. Letter to Schneider (Aug. 14, 1943), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, 
File 851 (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  See also 
Letter re: Mr. G (July 24, 1943), Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 851 (on 
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Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning that the Brussels police 
also participated in the processes of Aryanization.  In the au-
tumn of 1941, for example, the police of the District of Saint-
Gilles mounted a special surveillance operation at the open-air 
market on Boulevard Jamar following reports that the require-
ment that Jewish businesses carry a sign pursuant to the order 
was not being respected.  The report to the German Ortskom-
mandantur indicated that the problem was caused by the wind 
blowing merchandise about, momentarily covering the Jewish 
Undertaking signs.184  The next year, the Brussels police were 
charged with delivering liquidation notices to Jewish businesses 
and obtaining signed receipts of notification.  The order from 
the Chief of Police, Van Autgaerden, also carried a specific indi-
cation that, should service be impossible because the business 
had changed address, the notices were to be returned to head-
quarters so that they could be served by the police authorities 
in the appropriate district.185  
Once more, the historical construction of Brussels officials as 
resistant to any active role in the implementation of anti-
Jewish orders should be questioned.  The Permanent Council 
specifically forbade any investigations or similar measures 
meant to ensure a more perfect compliance with the decrees.  
Yet, in each case, the Brussels Police conducted inquiries and 
surveillance, and provided further information in order to en-
able more complete adherence to measures aimed at Brussels’ 
Jews.  The line between passive collaboration and participation 
appears to have been crossed even by the police force that, 
throughout the Occupation and afterwards, portrayed itself as 
  
file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).  A similar letter concern-
ing Widow G. was also sent to the Administrator.  The Board informed him 
that 252.75 BEF had been deducted from the account for consumption until 
May 31, 1943, when the account was closed.  Upon receiving written confirma-
tion from Widow G., the monies would be handed over to him.  In the mean-
time, the remainder of 447.25 BEF would be held for the Administrator.  See 
Letter of Aug. 28, 1943, Cabinet du Bourgmestre, AVB, File 851 (on file with 
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 184. Report (Sept. 8, 1941), AVB, Police, Guerre 40–45, File 791.94 (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
 185. Entreprises juives–Remise d’ordre de liquidation, Bulletin 
d’informations (Apr. 9, 1942), AVB, Police, Guerre 40–45, File 791.94 (on file 
with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). 
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loyal to the Belgian Constitution and to its legal duties there-
under.186  
IX. CONCLUSION 
What characterizes the City of Brussels and its agents with 
regard to the “Jewish question” is both passive collaboration 
and participation.  Yet, what is truly important here are two 
interrelated phenomena found in different contexts throughout 
occupied Europe.  Brussels officials, as well as the Secretaries-
General, operated in a system in which law continued to exist, 
in which the Belgian Constitution still had effect and in which 
the powers of the Occupier were, in theory, limited by the terms 
of the Hague Convention.  Yet, there was no principled protest 
about the registration and marking of Jewish cafes and restau-
rants.  There was no invocation of constitutional and interna-
tional law principles when Jewish property was expropriated or 
when schools were segregated.187 
The second phenomenon is the hermeneutic of acceptance.  
Once Belgians accepted the lawfulness and legitimacy of regis-
tration, identification, exclusion, separation, and expropriation, 
principled objection was almost impossible.  From the very be-
ginning, the terms “Jews” and “Aryans” appeared in official 
documents and daily administrative practice.  It is at this level 
of stark bureaucratic routine that we can begin to see what 
happened in Brussels and elsewhere in Belgium.  The “Jewish 
question” became a new administrative category and emerged 
in everyday practices to which the bureaucracy adjusted itself 
without a second thought. 
This bureaucratic routinization, which characterized much of 
the history of the fate and treatment of the Jews of Brussels 
throughout the Occupation, is exemplified by the use of the Star 
of David by certain parts of the bureaucracy in their internal 
system of documentation and filing.  Brussels officials did ob-
ject, based on humanitarian concerns, to the very idea of mark-
ing Jews with the Yellow Star.  Yet, several documents from the 
Mayor’s Office found in the City Archives include the   mark, 
  
 186. See id.  
 187. See Curran, supra note 14, at 9–10.  
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sometimes alone, sometimes with the letter “J” inside, marking 
the documents as ones dealing with “Jews.”188  
The   indicates, both literally and figuratively, that Jews, or 
matters pertaining to Jews, became a separate matter of bu-
reaucratic, legally justified categorization.  The constitutional 
equality of all Belgians was replaced in daily practice by a 
common, accepted and understood discourse of exclusion.  At a 
very practical level of bureaucratic compliance, the   marks the 
new Nazi legal category of the “Jew” as part of the routine in 
the Office of the Mayor of Brussels.  The road to Auschwitz to 
no small extent begins at the point at which a file can be 
marked by a patriotic and loyal Belgian civil servant or munici-
pal employee with a  .  This is the mundane reality of the con-
crete material practices of the Brussels bureaucracy.  Participa-
tion is this semiotic participation in the world-view of Nazi tax-
onomy.  Collaboration in Brussels is written  . 
 
  
 188. Although I cannot be absolutely certain, it appears that the marking 
with the  was contemporaneous with the document itself.  The documents so 
marked are found in the files of the Mayor’s office, which do not deal explicitly 
or exclusively with the “Jewish question.”  Instead, they are on copies of let-
ters to the German authorities contained in general correspondence files.  
